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Summary 
Human beings are social beings. One crucial prerequisite for successful interaction is the abil-
ity to reason about other people’s mind and understand other people’s mental and emotional 
states. Social neuroscience has recently started to investigate the neural mechanisms underly-
ing our capacity to represent other person’s mental states and emotions. Neuroimaging studies 
in adults have thoroughly investigated brain regions that are recruited when another person’s 
perspective is taken (taking a third person’s perspective as compared with taking one’s own 
perspective). Despite the remarkable results from neuroscientific research in adults, very little 
has been done so far to explore the development of perspective taking in children and adoles-
cents. The aim of the first study was to investigate the development of the neural network that 
yields cognitive perspective taking in school-aged children and adults. We therefore devel-
oped a task requiring the appraisal of leisure activities form a third- and first-person perspec-
tive. The results revealed that adults were more efficient than children during the perspective 
taking task, whereas both groups were concordant and equally appropriate in their judgments. 
Brain imaging data indicated that the development of perspective taking is associated with 
changes in brain activity within the described neural network of social cognition involving 
posterior parietal (mainly the inferior parietal cortex) as well as prefrontal brain areas (mainly 
the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). We have been able to specify that neural development 
of perspective taking accompanies a shift in brain activity from frontal to posterior and from 
bilateral to left unilateral parietal brain activation. We further tested, by means of variance 
measures and signal change of neural activity, whether increased efficiency during develop-
ment is supported by a focalization of the neural network. The results indicate that the addi-
tionally activated right inferior parietal cortex in children did not show more inter-subject 
variability than the other brain areas. Thus we can conclude that children use a qualitatively 
different, but coherent network in order to reason about other persons mind.  
  4 
The focus of the second study was to investigate the neural network underlying cognitive per-
spective taking at the onset of puberty. In addition, we were interested in developmental dif-
ferences between pubescent girls and boys. Behaviorally, children, adolescents and adults did 
not differ in appreciating 3PP. Despite of this equivalent performance, we found quantitative 
gender and age-group differences in reaction times for 3PP versus 1PP judgments. Moreover, 
by recording brain activity with fMRI, we observed differences between males and females as 
well as between age-groups in the activated fronto-parietal neural network. Processing a 3PP 
activated predominately the previous described fronto-parietal network across children, ado-
lescents and adults. The data of the second study show a different developmental pattern for 
boys and girls. We observed that pubescent girls and boys significantly differed in their profi-
ciency of perspective taking (RT) as well as in their neural activation patterns. Increased 
efficiency in female was characterized by a decrease in activity in the right dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex. This was not the case in males. In males, increased efficiency was related to 
changes in laterality within the in the inferior parietal cortex. These results warrant the con-
clusion that neural development of social cognition differs between male and female, which is 
particularly striking during adolescence.  
 
The present PhD thesis had the aim to deliver novel answers and questions for further investi-
gation. The results of these two studies provide new evidence that perspective-taking ability 
continues to develop after childhood and is associated with neural changes in the fronto-
parietal network. Moreover, the results highlight gender-specific neural development of cog-
nitive perspective taking during puberty. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Menschen sind äusserst soziale Wesen. Die Fähigkeit, die Gedanken, Gefühle und Absichten 
anderer Menschen zu verstehen stellt die Grundlage einer erfolgreichen sozialen Interaktion 
dar. Um mentale Zustände anderer Menschen verstehen und antizipieren zu können, benöti-
gen wir grundsätzliche die Fähigkeit zwischen eigenen und mentalen Zuständen anderer Per-
sonen zu unterscheiden. Darüber hinaus müssen wir in der Lage sein, unabhängig unserer 
eigenen Perspektive (1. Person-Perspektive, 1PP), die visuell-räumliche oder mentale Per-
spektive anderer Personen einzunehmen (3. Person-Perspektive, 3PP). Mit Hilfe bildgebender 
Verfahren konnten neurowissenschaftliche Studien zeigen, welche Hirnregionen aktiviert sind 
während Probanden sich in eine andere Person versetzen und deren Perspektive einnehmen. 
Während einige Studien an Erwachsenen die neuronalen Grundlagen der Perspektivenüber-
nahme untersucht haben, ist die Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeit sowohl in Verhaltensstudien als 
auch in neurowissenschaftlichen Studien kaum untersucht.  
Die vorliegende Dissertation liefert einen ersten Ansatz zur neurowissenschaftlichen Untersu-
chung der Entwicklung der mentalen Perspektivenübernahme bei Kindern und Adoleszenten 
mittels funktioneller Magnetresonanztomographie. Die erste Studie beschäftigt sich mit der 
Entwicklung der neuronalen Netzwerke, die mit dem Prozess der Perspektivenübernahme 
assoziiert sind. Die Resultate zeigen, dass Kinder und Erwachsene die Perspektive einer drit-
ten Person qualitativ übereinstimmend und adäquat einschätzen. Quantitative wird de 3PP mit 
zunehmendem Alter effizienter (kürzere Reaktionsseiten im Verhältnis zur Verarbeitung der 
eigenen Perspektive) beurteilt. Neurologisch ist die Entwicklung der Perspektivenübernahme 
mit Veränderungen der neuronalen Netzwerke im fronto-parietalen Kortex assoziiert. Dabei 
zeigte sich eine Entwicklung von frontaler zu posteriorer und von bilateraler zu unilateraler 
parietaler Hirnaktivierung. Die zunehmende Effizient der Perspektivenübernahme zeichnet 
sich weiter durch eine Fokalisierung der neuronalen Netzwerke aus. Die Resultate der ersten 
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Studie lassen den Schluss zu, dass Kinder qualitativ verschiedene, aber kohärente neuronale 
Netzwerke benutzen während sie sich in den mentalen Zustand einer anderen Person verset-
zen. 
 
Die zweite Studie hatte zum Ziel, die neuronalen Netzwerke der Perspektivenübernahme zur 
Zeit der Pubertät zu untersuchen. Dabei galt das Hauptinteresse möglichen entwicklungsbe-
dingten Geschlechtsunterschieden. Dazu wurden Kinder, junge Adoleszenten und Erwachsene 
beider Geschlechter untersucht. Wie die erste Studie bereits zeigte, unterscheiden sich die 
Altergruppen in der 2. Studie in der qualitativen Beurteilung der 3. Perspektive nicht vonein-
ander. Auch hier wurden Alterseffekte bezüglich der Reaktionszeiten für die 3PP im Ver-
gleich zur 1PP beobachtet. Zusätzlich zeigen sich Unterschiede zwischen den Geschlechtern. 
Die Geschlechts- und Altereffekte widerspiegeln sich auch in den Hirnaktivierungsdaten. Die 
Verarbeitung der 3PP aktiviert das bereits beschriebene fronto-parietale Netzwerk bei Kin-
dern, Adoleszenten und Erwachsenen. Es zeigen sich allerdings unterschiedliche Entwick-
lungsmuster für Mädchen und Knaben. Die zunehmende Effizienz der Perspektivenübernah-
me (RT) ist bei Mädchen mit einer Abnahme der Aktivierung im rechten dorsolateralen 
präfrontalen Kortex assoziiert. Diese Abnahme zeigen die Knaben nicht. Bei Knaben ging die  
zunehmende Effizient der Perspektivenübernahme mit einer Veränderung der Lateralität im 
inferioren parietalen Kortex einher. Die Resultate der zweiten Studie lassen die Schlussfolge-
rung zu, dass die Fähigkeit zur mentalen Perspektivenübernahme sich nach der Kindheit wei-
ter entwickelt. Darüber hinaus scheint sich die Entwicklung – insbesondere während der Ado-
leszenz - zwischen den Geschlechtern zu unterscheiden.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1. Social Neuroscience  
Social neuroscience can be defined as the exploration of the neurological underpinnings of 
social behavior and cognition (Decety et al., 2006). Social neuroscience investigates psycho-
logical constructs such as empathy, decision-making, moral reasoning or perspective taking 
that are difficult to map directly onto neural processes. It is therefore challenging to set eco-
logical valid social situation to explore complex and dynamic relationship between the brain 
and social interactions in the laboratory.  
The notion that behavior has a biological bases goes back to at least Galen in the ancient 
Greece who suggested that our social nature is influenced by an admixture of four substances 
in our body, called the four humors (blood, black bile, yellow bile and phlegm) that were 
linked to personality and interpersonal styles (sanguine, melancholic, choleric phlegmatic). 
Although humorism has long since fallen out of research interest, the notion that the material 
body, including the brain contributes to psychological processes has become increasingly im-
portant in psychological research. Of particular interest to social neuroscience is the famous 
patient Phineas Gage. After the incredible survival of an accident in which an iron rod pene-
trated his frontal brain, his personality and social functioning was changed so much, that his 
friends said he was “no longer Gage” whereas his motor skills and cognitive abilities retained. 
This case provided the first evidence that damage to the frontal brain can affect social behav-
ior and personality. In the following, other cases of neurological damage have demonstrated 
the neural contribution to successful social functioning. For instance damage to a certain re-
gion of parietal cortex can lead individuals to feel as if other people are controlling their bod-
ily movements. Damage to the fusiform gyrus may cause an inability to recognize faces even 
though other object can be recognized. Taken together, neurological case studies have been 
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extremely important for the fundamental understanding of the relationship between brain and 
behavior, but such cases are rare and thus are not sufficient to sustain a new area of research. 
The accessibility of functional magnetic resonance imaging technology in the early 1990s 
enabled researchers to investigate cortical and subcortical brain bases of behavior in healthy 
normal volunteers. Since many cognitive psychologists became cognitive neuroscientists, they 
first investigated the neuronal bases of language, memory and attention. Since the beginning 
of this century social neuroscience started to capture attention of researchers from multiple 
disciplines such as cognitive neuroscience, social psychology, developmental science, eco-
nomics, and cognitive psychology. Currently, social neuroscientist investigate automatic and 
controlled aspects of social cognition, mental state attribution (also known as theory of mind), 
empathy, decision-making, moral reasoning but also self-knowledge, self-recognition and 
self-awareness. Many of these topics are in its infancy with no more than a handful studies 
intending to identify brain regions that are involved in the process of interest. The most obvi-
ous impact of neuroimaging methods for social neuroscience is that they provide tools to dis-
entangle cognitive and emotional processes, which experientially feel similar and produce 
similar behavioral results, but actually rely on different underlying mechanisms. And, on the 
other hand, it could be shown that different processes such as perceiving and observing physi-
cal pain rely at least partly on same brain mechanisms.  
A drawback of social neuroscience is that it can be perceived as the comeback of phrenology 
(Uttal et al., 2003). Functional imaging has become a very popular and in many respects also 
a seductive tool leading to over-simplistic characterization of social cognition and behavior. 
Although most neuroscientist agree that it is impossible to determine whether a person is ex-
periencing empathy or anger by just looking at the activity in particular brain regions, several 
neuroscientist seem to neglect that knowledge, particular when labeling brain areas as the “the 
empathic brain” or specifying brain regions as being responsible to psychopathological behav-
ior. It is clear; on one hand our social behavior is in many respects specialized for guiding our 
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social interactions with others and that it is more complex than other aspects of behavior. But 
on the other hand, it is equally apparent that social cognition depends on many of the same 
mental processes and hence presumably on many of the same brain structures as non-social 
mental processes. One therefore might argue that studying social cognition requires somewhat 
different methods. Since neuroscientists use constructs such as empathy for which we cannot 
provide precise definitions, findings of single studies may not permit decisive conclusions. In 
contrast to studies investigating perceptive processes, it is likely to be that every single study 
on social cognitive information processing investigates only a particular aspect of social cog-
nition which is limited by its in eliminable confounds but consistency of activation across 
many studies may will permit reliable statements of brain-behavior relationship.  
 
1.2. Top-down and Bottom-up Processes of Understanding Other Human 
Beings 
The ability to understand other person’s emotions and mental states is essential for virtually 
all aspects of social behavior. Understanding other’s emotional and mental states requires 
both rapid stimulus-driven processes as well as reflective top-down processes (Decety et al., 
2004). Evidence for stimulus-driven mechanisms of understanding others initially came from 
imaging studies showing that the same motor regions are activated during the execution and 
observation of specific movements (Gallese et al., 2004). Subsequent studies showed that di-
rect experience and observation of pain or emotions such as disgust activates overlapping neu-
ral systems. It has thus been argued that shared neural representations facilitate the direct ex-
periential understanding of affective states which in turn might provide a substrate of empathy 
(Decety & Jackson, 2004; Keysers et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003). However, understanding 
others is not always so simple. Under certain conditions, context information is needed to 
constrain differentiated attributions about other person’s intentions and emotional states. Fur-
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thermore, the automatically activated shared representations and presumable empathic con-
nections might be inhibited –if one perceives for instance another person to be a potential un-
fair competitor or if the nonverbal cues of emotions are ambiguous (Singer et al., 2006). 
Therefore the engagement of controlled processes enables us to actively adopt another per-
son’s perspective and thus understand more complex emotional and mental states when stimu-
lus-triggered processing of situational information is not sufficient. These processes in turn 
depend on different neural network (Olsson et al., 2008).  
In everyday language as well as in scientific literature the bottom-up processes of understand-
ing others are referred to as empathy and the top-down processes as theory of mind, mentaliz-
ing, and cognitive perspective taking. Although all of these concepts describe our ability to 
step into the ‘shoes’ of others, the capacity to ‘mentalize’ and to ‘empathize’ are distinct and 
rely of different neuro-cognitive circuits.  
The focus of the present PhD-thesis was the investigation of the development of the top-down 
process of understanding others, in particular the development of cognitive perspective taking 
and its neural underpinnings. In the following, the term social cognition will be used to sum-
marize different social cognitive aspects such as perspective taking, mentalizing, theory of 
mind, which often are used as synonyms.  
 
1.3. Stepping into Other Person’s Shoes: the Ability of Perspective Taking 
and its Development 
The ability to take another person’s perspective is crucial for successful social interaction. 
Reasoning about others, and understand what they think, feel or believe involves stepping into 
their ‘mental shoes’ and thus adopt their perspective (Gallese et al., 1998). Perspective taking 
includes the awareness of one’s own subjective space or mental state (first-person perspective 
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or 1PP) and the ability to ascribe locations, mental states or emotions to another person (third-
person perspective or 3PP).  
There is currently much debate about the mechanisms of perspective taking. How do we 
automatically switch roles from oneself to another person in everyday social interaction? A 
predominant view is that we understand others by mentally simulating their actions (Harris, 
1995). Neurophysiological studies have supported the ‘simulation theory’ demonstrating that 
common brain areas are activated both when we execute a certain action and when we ob-
serve another person performing the same action (this is known as the mirror neuron system) 
(Decety et al., 1997). The discovery of the mirror neuron system has further supported the 
simulation theory. In the following it has been suggested that simulating another person’s 
action is a ontogenetic precursor of understanding thoughts and emotions (Gallese & Gold-
mann, 1998). On the other side of the debate the ‘theory-theory’ claims that we use a common 
sense of psychological theory of folk psychology to understand other people’s mind, rather 
than internally simulating them (Gopnik et al., 1997).  
Piaget has first described the development of children’s perspective-taking abilities. He 
claimed that children are cognitively egocentric. They do not know that they are mental enti-
ties with conceptual, perceptual and affective perspectives and points of view. As a conse-
quence, they cannot know that they themselves have their own perspective and these perspec-
tives can differ from those of others. Therefore they unwittingly respond in terms of their own 
point of view when asked to respond in terms of another person’s point of view. Piaget be-
lieved that children become less egocentric with age, but he did not claim that adults are 
wholly non-egocentric in their thinking (Piaget, 1959). Furthermore social psychological stud-
ies with adults have demonstrated that even adults frequently make predictable error when 
assessing other persons’ perspectives (Gilovich et al. 2002, Nickerson 1999, Royzman et al. 
2003).
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The tendency to use self-knowledge as the primary basis for developing a model of what oth-
ers know has been described by several authors as a default mode of reasoning about others’ 
mind. Although the details and the level of complexity of the task used to assess this ability in 
children and adults may vary, it seems that both have difficulties in setting aside their own 
privileged knowledge in predicting another persons’ perspective. Consistent with Piaget’s 
view, several studies since the 1950s have documented increasing perspective taking abilities 
with age (Flavell, 1992).  
A second wave of research on the development of children’s knowledge about the mind of 
others started in the 1980’s and is still dominant in the field of cognitive developmental psy-
chology: the theory of mind research. The term “theory of mind” originally comes from pri-
mate research. Premark and Wood ruff (Premack et al., 1978) published a paper with the title: 
does the chimpanzee has a theory of mind? It refers to the question, whether chimpanzees 
have an implicit assumption that the behavior of others is determined by their thoughts, de-
sires, beliefs and attitudes. In the following year’s developmental psychologists began to in-
vestigate the development of a theory of mind (ToM) in children, by testing them if they can 
predict another persons behavior based on that person’s false belief (Wimmer et al., 1983), for 
review see (Flavell, 1999). This second wave of research have shown that signs of social 
competence develop during early infancy, when infants start to ascribe actions to an entity by 
the age of 12 months (Johnson, 2003; Spelke et al., 1995). At the age of 18 months infants 
begin to understand intentions and they acquire joint attention skills, for example, to follow an 
adult’s eye gaze toward a goal (Carpenter et al., 1998). These early social abilities precede 
higher social skills such as “the false belief understanding”. By the age of 4-5 years children 
start to realize that another person’s belief about a particular situation may differ from their 
own (what has been called: “theory of mind”) (Astington, 1993; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Gopnik, 1993). More complex is the comprehension of a ‘faux pas’ situation. A ‘faux pas’ 
happens when somebody says something she/he should not have said. Understanding ‘faux 
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pas’ requires simultaneous representation of two mental states: the perspective of a person, 
who commits the ‘faux pas’, and the representation of a second-person’s perspective, who 
may feel offence or irritation. ‘Faux pas’ may not be reliably understood before the age of 9-
10 years. Baron-Cohen could further show that females precede males in ‘faux pas’ detection 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997).  
Taken together, large literature has accrued on the development of social competence during 
infancy up the age of 6 years but very little has been done so far on later development. Baron-
Cohen pointed out that the passing of the standard theory of mind tests should be considered 
as relatively early points in the development of social competence rather than the end-point.  
 
1.4. Perspective Taking and the Brain  
The first researchers who started to investigate the neural bases of social cognition using brain 
imaging methods were inspired by developmental psychology (Flavell, 1999; Fletcher et al., 
1995; Frith et al., 2003). Theory of mind paradigms were used to investigate the neural 
mechanism of social cognition by comparing brain activation while participants reason about 
another persons belief with conditions requiring them to understand physical causal reason-
ing. A meta-analysis on theory of mind imaging studies (Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher et al., 
2003) revealed a consistent involvement of mainly three brain regions: the medial prefrontal 
cortex, the posterior superior temporal sulcus extending to temporo-parietal junction  and the 
temporal poles – the so-called “mentalizing network”. The problem, however, with using 
ToM paradigms is that they use physical conditions to contrast the ability to represent mental 
states. It thus remains open to what extend the self perspective is involved in modeling some-
one else’s perspective. To accommodate for these problems another line of research starts to 
investigate the neural mechanisms underlying the ability to represent mental states of others. 
These studies compare conditions in which participants imagine another person’s perspective 
with condition in which they imagine their own perspective. The focus of those studies was to 
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investigate whether taking someone else’s perspective as opposed to taking ones own per-
spective relies on overlapping or differential brain mechanism. Taking a third-person perspec-
tive, whether it involved thinking about how another person would think, feel or imagine 
them making an action relative to one’s own perspective has been associated with brain acti-
vation in the inferior parietal cortex, the medial posterior cortex (posterior cingu-
late/precuneus) and medial prefrontal cortex (David et al., 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff et al., 
2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Ruby et al., 2001, 2003, 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001). Furthermore 
neuropsychological evidence has additionally pointed out the importance of the inferior parie-
tal cortex (IPC) and TPJ for perspective taking as well as for the distinction between self and 
other (Decety et al., 2003). Damage to this regions not only impairs the ability to represent 
different perspectives (Samson et al., 2004) and it can lead a patient to believe that his own 
body is controlled by external forces (Mesulam, 1981). In summary, perspective taking stud-
ies in adults have shown common brain activation in 1PP and 3PP conditions as well as dif-
ferential activity between the two perspectives. It has been suggested that the differential 
brain activity implies that simulation cannot be the only mechanism involved in mental state 
attribution.  
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2 Developmental Brain Plasticity 
Neuroimaging techniques have shown that the human brain undergoes substantial develop-
mental changes from infancy though adolescence (see Paus, 2005 for review). These devel-
opmental changes do not follow rigid rules whereby different developmental phases are ini-
tialized by genetically determined programs. Brain development is based on maturation and 
neuroplasticity, which refers to the lifelong ability of the brain to reorganize neural circuits 
based on experiences or sensory stimulation. Plasticity is the mechanism for emerging compe-
tence and skill acquisition, and allows the brain to adopt itself to its environment. In order to 
learn and improve new skills, there must be persistent functional changes in the brain that 
represent new abilities (Elbert et al., 2001). Brain plastic changes occur at multiple levels of 
neuronal organization, from molecules and synapses to cortical maps and neural networks 
(Buonomano and Merzenich, 1998). The brain mechanisms underlying plasticity are based on 
adjustments in the strength of connections between brain cells, reflected by alterations in the 
internal structure and number of synapses.  
The early brain development is characterized by rapid brain growth (Garey, 1984). The prolif-
eration and overproduction of neurons occurs prenatally, whereas cell death (apoptosis) be-
gins and continues until the second postnatal year. Likewise, an overproduction of cell arbori-
zation and synaptic contacts can be observed in the first year of life, which then is followed 
by an elimination of ‘pruning’ phase (Huttenlocher, 1990). During synaptic pruning the un-
used and infrequently used connections are eliminated. Connections that have been activated 
most frequently are preserved, a mechanism referred to as Hebbian competition (Hebb, 1949). 
Experiences determine which connections will be strengthened and which will be pruned. The 
importance of postnatal experience for normal development has first been described by sev-
eral animal studies. For instance Hubel and Wiesel demonstrated that the brain of cats under-
goes sensitive periods during which environmental stimulation is crucial for normal brain 
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development and perceptual development (Wiesel et al., 1963). These experiments suggested 
that human brain might show the similar sensitive periods in very early development. Only 
later post-mortem brain research by Huttenlocher demonstrated that some human brain areas 
continue to develop beyond the early childhood.  
Today, non-invasive magnetic resonance brain imaging techniques (MRI) allow the analysis 
of living human brains and furthermore provide the opportunity to investigate human brain 
development across life-span by longitudinal studies. Most MRI studies have focused on de-
velopmental changes in grey matter volume (which correspond to the volume of cell bodies, 
synapses and neuropil) and white matter volume (which correspond to the volume myelinated 
axons). Their findings are remarkable consistent (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; 
Paus, 2005; Sowell et al., 2003).  
The volume of white matter increases during the first 20 years of life. While the sensory and 
motor regions become fully myelinated in the first few years of life, axons in frontal and pa-
rietal regions continue to be myelinated into adolescence (Giedd, 1999). In contrast, grey mat-
ter volume development appears to follow a non-linear pattern. The peak of grey matter den-
sity and the following experience-dependent pruning processes are regionally specific. Grey 
matter in the frontal and parietal lobe increases during childhood with a peak at about age 12 
years followed by a decline. Grey matter volume in the temporal lobe reaches its peak only by 
the age of 16 years, whereas cortical grey matter in the occipital lobe continued to increase 
after the age 20 years. 
Moreover, the region-specific developmental decrease in GM volume which has been re-
ported in frontal, parietal and temporal areas (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell 
et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2002; Wilke et al., 2007) differs between boys and girls. The 
changes in frontal and parietal cortices occur one to two years earlier in boys than boys. In 
this context it has recently been suggested that the development of the adolescent brain might 
respond differently to changing levels of testosterone and estradiol. E.g. it could be demon-
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strated that the levels of sex steroids in children between 8 and 15 years of age were associ-
ated with sexual dimorphic gray matter areas (Neufang et al., 2009). The reported neuro-
anatomical changes during adolescence may reflect a refinement of neuronal connections that 
could be related to cognitive and emotional development.   
Giedd (1999) has demonstrated that the development of grey matter volume is different in 
males and females at least in some regions. Grey matter density in the frontal lobe increases 
during pre-adolescence with a maximum in 11 years old females and 12 years old males fol-
lowed by a decline during post-adolescence. Parietal grey matter development follows a simi-
lar pattern, with a peak of volume at the age of 10 years in females and at 12 years in males. 
Temporal and occipital grey matter development was not different between girls and boys. 
Although no measure of puberty rather than levels of steroid hormones were taken, it might 
be argued that the onset of puberty rather than age per se triggers these gender-specific time 
courses of development at least in frontal and parietal regions.  
 
2.1. Implications to Functional Brain Development 
The continued myelination is thought to influence the transmission speed of neural informa-
tion whereas the relatively late elimination of excess synapses has been suggested to be re-
sponsible for more diffuse and widespread activation pattern and less efficient cognitive 
strategies in children and adolescents (Casey, Tottenham et al., 2005; Durston & Casey, 
2006a). Previous functional neuroimaging studies in children and adolescents reported that 
development is supported by changes in pattern of brain activation, including enhancement of 
activation in critical regions, attenuation in others, and changes in the extent of activation as 
well as shifts in lateralization (Durston & Casey, 2006b). While the nature and time course of 
structural changes during development have been described in detail, its relation to the devel-
opment of the functional development is, however, not yet clear. 
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3 Analyzing the Brain: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imag-
ing 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is beside event-related brain potential record-
ings (ERPs) based on the scalp recorded electrical signals of the brain the most widely used 
method for studying the neural basis of human behavior. fMRI provides us the opportunity to 
study the interplay between brain and behavior and since the method is non-invasive the in-
vestigation of children’s brain function is possible. FMRI is based upon the principles of nu-
clear magnetic resonance (NMR), a technique that is sensitive to the magnetic properties of 
molecules. The fMRI technique is capable to visualize the physiological changes in oxy- and 
deoxyhemoglobin concentration in cortical venous blood vessels, in particular the capillary 
bed, upon neuronal activation. The fMRI signal depends on the fact that there is a close cou-
pling between changes in activity of a neuronal population and changes in its blood supply. 
Since fMRI can monitor focal changes in hemodynamic parameters, it provides only an indi-
rect measure of neuronal activity. The basic mechanism underlying fMRI is the blood oxy-
genation level -dependant (BOLD) contrast (Ogawa, Lee et al. 1990). Since the magnetic sus-
ceptibility of deoxyhemoglobin is greater than that of oxyhemoglobin, MRI signal is sensitive 
to the ratio of deoxy- to oxyhemoglobin. The increase in blood supply triggered by increases 
in neural activity delivers more oxygen than is needed to meet metabolic demands. Therefore, 
the blood draining from an active neuronal population is more richly oxygenated than during 
the resting state. In consequence the ratio of deoxy- to oxyhemoglobin concentrations de-
creases, which leads to an increase in the MR signal. Contrasting both active and resting states 
reveals areas of neuronal activation. Thus, fMRI is able to detect changes in neuronal activa-
tion between different states. The basic procedure to localize brain areas related to a specific 
function is to manipulate the experimental parameters over time and then to interrogate the 
hemodynamic signal changes in each volume element (voxel) in the brain in relation to the 
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experimental manipulation. As a result, statistical activation map are generated, showing in 
which voxels in the brain signal changes correlate best with the changes in the experiment. 
 
3.1. Functional Brain Imaging in Pediatric Population  
The noninvasive technique of fMRI is considered to be an ideal technique to study brain func-
tions in children. Despite the enormous advantages one has to act with several problems when 
working with children. Many aspects of participating in an fMRI experiment can be challeng-
ing for children (e.g., assessment in a medical environment, large and noisy equipment and 
confinement in a small space). Discomfort with the scanning procedure may affect perform-
ance and neural activation through decreased attention to instructions, decreased task per-
formance and engagement of emotional and stress-related systems during the procedure. Ex-
planation of, and acclimation to, the scanning environment prior to the actual fMRI data ac-
quisition, is key to avoiding these problems. It has to be ensured that the child understands the 
task and is physically able to operate the devices. Moreover, the child has to be willing and 
cooperate during the whole experiment (30 minutes) in the uncomfortable scanner environ-
ment without substantial head movement. Simulation of the scanner experience allows the 
child to get used with the procedure. We used a teddy bear to simulate and explain the proce-
dure to the children and after that, the child could play the investigator by moving the bear in 
and out of the scanner. Scanner noise not only interferes with cognitive tasks it also hampers 
children’s comfort. For noise reduction we used earplugs and additionally equipped the inside 
of the scanner with a sound diminishing foam mat. The wearing of video goggles helped chil-
dren to not actually realize that they are being moved into a narrow hole. To keep the child 
occupied during the localization and anatomical scans a video was shown.  
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Figure 1 :The comic being used in order to explain the scanning procedure to the child 
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4 Conclusions and Hypothesis 
Despite the remarkable results from neuroscientific research on perspective taking abilities in 
adults, little has been done so far to explore the neuronal development underlying these func-
tions in normal achieving children and adolescents. No study has investigated the neural de-
velopment of cognitive perspective taking yet but a handful fMRI studies investigated other 
social cognitive processes such as understanding irony (Wang, 2006), thinking about inten-
tions (Blakemore, 2006) or social-knowledge retrieval. Among theses studies there seem to be 
some consistency regarding the direction of change in prefrontal cortex activity. In various 
frontal regions a decrease of brain activity with development was found, particularly in the 
medial prefrontal and the inferior prefrontal cortex. On the other hand structural brain devel-
opmental studies have revealed changes in grey matter volume during late childhood, adoles-
cence and even early adulthood (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003; 
Toga et al., 2006). It is currently unknown how brain maturation influences the development 
of social cognition. A general idea coming from studies on development of language and 
executive functions is that children show similar but more distributed neural pattern compared 
to adults. These findings have been referred to as focalization of neural development (Casey, 
Galvan et al., 2005; Durston, Davidson et al., 2006). A problem, however, with interpreting 
focalization of neural activation is that differences in brain activation between children and 
adults can be confounded with differences in variability between group.  
 
Aims of Study 1: To investigate the behavioral and neural development of cognitive perspec-
tive taking and to test whether the development of perspective taking is supported by a focal-
ization of the neural network by means of measures of variance and signal change of neural 
activity.  
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Hypothesis of Study 1: we hypothesize that processing another person’s perspective would 
become increasingly efficient during development (decrease of reaction times) and is associ-
ated with changes the fronto-parietal network of social cognition involving posterior parietal 
regions (mainly the inferior parietal cortex) as well as prefrontal brain areas. 
We further tested whether the development of perspective taking is supported by a focaliza-
tion of the neural network involved in perspective taking by means of measures of variance 
and signal change of neural activity.  
 
Aims of Study 2: Structural brain developmental studies in adolescence have not only dem-
onstrated that grey matter development is prolonged but also revealed that the brain undergoes 
considerable gender-dependent development during adolescence (Giedd 1999). The gender-
specific development is especially pronounced in parietal and frontal brain regions. The aim 
of study 2 was therefore to investigate perspective taking at the onset of puberty in girls and 
boys. 
Hypothesis of Study 2: Given the facts that 1) brain imaging studies on perspective taking in 
adults have identified the importance of a fronto-parietal network, 2) structural studies dem-
onstrated that these regions continue to develop until early adulthood and 3) differ between 
girls and boys; we hypothesize developmental differences in the neural network underlying 
cognitive perspective taking between genders.  
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5 Learning to appreciate others: Neural development of cogni-
tive perspective taking1 
Dosch M, Loenneker T, Bucher K, Martin E, Klaver P 
 
5.1. Abstract 
Neuroimaging studies in adults have thoroughly investigated brain regions that are recruited 
when we put ourselves in another person's shoes. Taking a third-person perspective (3PP) as 
opposed to a first-person perspective (1PP) has been associated with brain activation in the 
inferior parietal cortex, the medial posterior cortex and the prefrontal cortex. Here we investi-
gate for the first time the development of the neural network that yields cognitive perspective 
taking. Twelve adults (aged 25-32 years) and twelve school-aged children (aged 8-10 years) 
were investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Behaviorally, we 
found a decrease of reaction time differences between 3PP and 1PP with age indicating that 
adults were more efficient in processing a 3PP. Despite the reaction time differences both 
groups were equally accurate in their judgments. Brain imaging data indicated neural activity 
in the left inferior parietal cortex and precuneus for adults during 3PP as compared with 1PP 
judgments. Children additionally showed enhanced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex and the right inferior parietal cortex. We found a significant interaction between groups 
and brain activation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and in the right inferior parietal 
cortex. These results suggest that the development of the ability to reason about another per-
son's mind accompanies a shift in activity from frontal to posterior brain regions and from 
bilateral to unilateral left inferior parietal cortex.  
                                            
 
 
1 Artice in Press, NeuroImage	  (2009),	  doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.013 
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5.2. Introduction 
Since the beginning of this century neuroscience methods have been applied to the investiga-
tion of social cognition in adult subjects. Reasoning about other people’s mind and under-
standing what they think, feel or believe requires the ability to step into their “mental shoes” 
and reason according their perspective (Gallese et al., 1998). This is crucial for successful 
social interaction. Perspective taking includes the awareness of one’s own subjective spatial 
and mental space (first-person perspective, 1PP) and the ability to ascribe visuo-spatial per-
spectives and mental states (cognitive or emotional states) to another person (third-person 
perspectives, 3PP). In the present study we investigate the ability to take another person’s 
mental perspective.  
Neuroimaging studies revealed brain regions that are active when we step into another per-
sons mental perspective to represent his or her experience as compared to one’s own.  For 
instance, we take a 3PP when we try to appreciate what another person thinks about a particu-
lar topic or feels in a given situation. Taking the mental perspective of another person, as op-
posed to the own perspective has been associated with brain activation in the inferior parietal 
cortex, including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), medial posterior cortex (posterior cin-
gulate/precuneus) and medial prefrontal cortex (David et al., 2006; Ruby et al., 2001, 2003, 
2004; Vogeley et al., 2001). Furthermore neuropsychological evidence has also highlighted 
the importance of the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) and TPJ for perspective taking as well as 
for the distinction between self and other (Decety et al., 2003a). Direct cortical stimulation of 
the right IPC has induced the phenomenon of out of body experience in an epileptic patient 
(Blanke et al., 2002), and damage to this area can lead a patient to believe that his own body 
is controlled by external forces (Mesulam, 1981). 
 
Despite the remarkable results from neuroscientific research on perspective taking in adults, 
little has been done so far to explore the neuronal development underlying these functions in 
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normal achieving children. Structural brain developmental studies have revealed changes in 
grey and white matter during late childhood, adolescence and even early adulthood. Both 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies demonstrated that changes in frontal and parietal re-
gions are especially pronounced and prolonged. Whereas white matter volume seems to in-
crease linearly during the first two decades of life, grey matter development, particularly in 
posterior parietal and prefrontal cortices, increases from early childhood until about the age 
12 (around the onset of puberty) and is followed by a decline during adolescence (Giedd et 
al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2003; Toga et al., 2006). While the nature and 
time course of structural changes during development have been described in detail, few stud-
ies focused on functional development. A general idea coming from studies on development 
of language and executive functions is that children show similar but more distributed pattern 
compared to adults. These findings have been referred to as focalization of neural develop-
ment (Casey et al., 2005; Durston et al., 2006). 
It is currently unknown how brain maturation influences the development of social cognition. 
Most research on the behavioral development of social cognition has been conducted in chil-
dren between the age of 4-7 years (Astington, 1983, Baron-Cohen, 1993, Leslie, 1985), which 
indicates that major steps in social cognition are completed by that age. Although no study 
has investigated the neural development of perspective taking abilities, a handful fMRI stud-
ies investigate other social cognitive processes such as understanding irony (Wang, 2006), 
thinking about own intentions (Blakemore, 2006) or social-knowledge retrieval (Pfeifer, 
2007). Among these studies, there seems to be some consistency with respect to the direction 
of change in prefrontal activity. In various frontal regions a decrease of activity with devel-
opment was found particularly in the medial prefrontal and the inferior frontal cortex (for re-
view see (Blakemore, 2008).  
Hence, on the basis of these structural and functional imaging results we hypothesize that the 
neural development of cognitive perspective taking is associated with changes in brain activ-
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ity within the described neural network of social cognition involving posterior parietal regions 
(mainly the inferior parietal cortex) as well as prefrontal brain areas. 
 
To test this hypothesis we developed a task requiring the appraisal of leisure activities from a 
third- or first-person perspective. Leisure activities are much more self-defining during child-
hood and adolescence than school activities because they provide more opportunity for self-
direction and initiative than school performance activities. Self-defining activities tell children 
and adolescents something about “who they really are” or “what they are like” as a person and 
are therefore essential for the distinction between oneself and other persons (Larson, 2001 ). 
During the task short statements of real life situations were presented to both adults and chil-
dren, who were required to make judgments for themselves and for another person who was 
introduced by a story. To assure that especially children adopt the mental perspective of an-
other person and to keep the level of familiarity equal across all participants we chose a very 
different and unknown personality as a third-person. Choosing a third-person with very dif-
ferent characteristics allowed us to provoke qualitative differences between 1PP and 3PP 
judgments. To introduce participants with the other person we used a story of a child/adult 
with autistic behavior- we called him Paul. The story comprised his social behavior at home 
and during kindergarten and school time, his academic skills as well as his special interests. 
Participants did not know that Paul has been diagnosed as having Asperger’s syndrome nor 
did they know any other psychiatric diagnosis.  
Since brain imaging as well as lesion studies on perspective taking in adults pointed to the 
importance of a fronto-parietal network, and structural studies showed that this network is not 
fully developed until early adulthood we expected that processing another person’s perspec-
tive would become increasingly efficient during development (decrease of reaction times) and 
is associated with changes in brain activation within the prefrontal (particularly in the medial 
and inferior frontal) and the inferior parietal cortex. We further tested whether the develop-
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ment of perspective taking is supported by a focalization of the neural network involved in 
perspective taking by means of measures of variance and signal change of neural activity.  
 
5.3. Methods 
Participants 
Data were acquired from 12 children between 8.5 and 10.6 years of age (mean 10.0 years, 6 
male) and 12 adults (aged 24.6-32.3, mean 29.1, 4 male). All children were recruited from 
public schools in the city of Zurich. Participants completed the German version of the autism-
spectrum quotient questionnaire for adults or for children (AQ, Baron-Cohen, 2006) – a quan-
titative self-report instrument for assessing how many autistic traits a person has. None of the 
participants scored above the critical minimum of 30 out of 50 autistic traits (mean children: 
18.73, mean adults: 16.35). No significant group differences (t(1,21)=-1.19,p=0.249) or sex 
differences were found (t(1,21)=0.187, p=0.854). Participants were also asked to indicate on 
an analogous scale (ranging from 0-100) how much they felt like Paul irrespective of sex. 
Female and males did not differ in their ratings (mean female=193, mean male=254, 
t(1,22)=0.904, p=0.376). Adult participants were university students. Four additional children 
had to be excluded due to extensive movement during the fMRI scanning (>5mm) and were 
therefore also excluded from behavioral analysis. All participants were right-handed as as-
sessed by the Edinburgh Inventory Scale (Oldfield, 1971). None of the participants had a sig-
nificant history of medical, psychiatric or neurological disorders on the basis of self- or par-
ent-report. None of the participants used any neurotropic or psychotropic medication. Written 
informed consent was obtained from all participants, as well as written informed parental con-
sent for child participants. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and con-
ducted in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Helsinki Declaration. 
Task Description 
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Children were introduced to a virtual “other child” by reading a story about Paul a child with 
autistic behavior; adults likewise learned about a grown-up person with autistic behavior. 
During the fMRI measurement, the task required participants to make judgments about 32 
leisure activities for themselves or for the other person. Activities with and without social 
interaction (with SI, no SI) were chosen to provoke differences in judgment for the 1PP and 
3PP condition (assuming that Paul would dislike all social interactions). Separate task ver-
sions were created for children and for adults. The task employed a design in which the type 
of stimulus and the perspective taken by the participants were manipulated. In the self-
perspective condition, subjects were asked to evaluate how much they like to do certain ac-
tivities. In the other-perspective condition, subjects were instructed to imagine Paul and an-
swer according to his preferences and interests and to ignore their own. In all trials, subjects 
were presented first with a picture of themselves or of Paul (duration 2 seconds) to indicate 
the perspective they had to adopt for answering the upcoming question. Subsequently, a sen-
tence (e.g. ‘going to a friend’s birthday party’ or ‘reading a book’) was presented in black on 
a grey background (duration 6 seconds) together with a slider for answering, followed by a 
fixation cross (500 ms). Sixteen null-events in which only a fixation cross was shown were 
included and presented randomly. Participants were required to make their judgment by press-
ing the left or right button with the middle or index finger of their right hand. The button press 
moved a red marker on a slide on a continuous scale from left “I don’t like to do this activity 
at all” to right “I like to do this activity very much” (the scale range was from -100 to +100 
with no visible scale in between). The longer the left/right button is pressed, the more the 
slider moves to the left/right side of the scale. The starting point of the red marker on the con-
tinuous scale was presented randomly. Each of the four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no SI, 
3PP with SI, 3PP no SI) consisted of 16 trials which had to be judged according to both per-
spectives (total 64 trials). The sequence of the trials was generated randomly for each partici-
pant. Each activity had to be judged for themselves as well as for Paul.  
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Experimental Procedure 
Before the scanning session we took a picture of the participant and introduced him/her to 
Paul by showing a picture of him. Then, participants were instructed to learn about the other 
Paul by reading a story about a male child/adult with autistic behavior describing his social 
behavior, academic skills as well as his interests. Participants did not know that Paul has the 
diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome.  
We used different versions for adults and children. The difference between histories was that 
Paul’s biography continued until adulthood for adults, but stopped at childhood (ca. 10 years) 
for the children. Similarly, the photograph of Paul was adapted to the age of the participants. 
The story comprised 200 words for children and 293 for adults. Participants were then asked 
to retell the story and answer several questions to ensure that they understood correctly and 
could imagine the Paul’s personality. After introducing participant to Paul we carefully in-
structed them in the whole fMRI procedure and explained the task. Participants then practiced 
5 trials from the 1PP and 5 from the 3PP. We again emphasized that it was very important to 
really try to imagine Paul and that we were interested in seeing how their brain works while 
they are thinking of him. We used MR-compatible video goggles to present the stimuli and 
additional acoustic noise protection by headphone (MRI Audio/Video System, Resonance 
Technology, Inc., USA) throughout the examinations. The task was programmed by Cogent 
implemented under MATLAB (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/CogentGraphics/). 
 
MRI Data acquisition and analysis 
BOLD sensitive images were collected on a 3.0 T General Electric MR-scanner using a gradi-
ent-echo EPI-sequence with a repetition time of 2000 ms and a 64x64 matrix. Altogether, 32 
slices were aligned to the anterior and posterior commissure (flip angle = 50º, FOV= 24cm, 
slice thickness per volume = 3.8mm, 360 repetitions). Secondly, a three dimensional T1-
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weighted anatomical scan (FOV = 230 mm x 198 mm x 158 mm, matrix = 224x192x132; TR 
= 8.6 ms; TE = 2.1 ms) of the whole brain was acquired. Images were analyzed using SPM5 
(Statistical Parametric Mapping software, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, 
London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The fMRI data were realigned and un-
wrapped for movement correction and were then normalized to a SPM template with a resam-
pled voxel size of 3 mm3 and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full width at half maximum: 
9mm).  
For each participant the expected hemodynamic responses for each trial were modeled by two 
response functions, which were a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its 
temporal derivative. The functions were convolved with the event train of stimulus onset to 
create covariates in a general linear model. Misses were modeled as a parameter of no inter-
est. Parameter estimates for four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no SI, 3PP with SI, 3PP no SI) 
were obtained by maximum-likelihood estimation while using a temporal high-pass filter (cut-
off 128 s) and modeling temporal autocorrelation as an AR(1) process. Since neural develop-
ment of perspective taking (1PP, 3PP) was the focus of our interest, we collapsed trials with 
and without social interaction. We added the analysis of the brain activation associated with 
the type of task (with SI, no SI) in the supplementary material.   
In a voxel based analysis comparison between each condition and rest, and direct comparison 
between conditions were thresholded at p<0.05 (FWE corrected, k>10) and p<0.005 (uncor-
rected, k>5 voxels) for regions for which we had a strong a priori hypothesis, namely, the pre-
frontal and parietal cortex (Forman, 1995, Pfeiffer, 2007). To specifically look at develop-
mental effects of perspective taking we calculated a ROI analysis on the basis of the activa-
tion patterns from the main effect of 3PP and 1PP judgments. Because we have two inde-
pendent groups the ROIs were based on the activation patters across all participants (3PP > 
1PP and 1PP > 3PP with a threshold of p=0.005, uncorrected, k>5 voxel). The children’s and 
adults’ data were compared in 12 regions of interest (ROI). According to these main effects 
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10-mm spheres around the local maxima of each significant cluster for each contrast 
(3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP) were created using marsbar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). Mean 
percent signal changes were taken from the raw data of every study participant for all condi-
tions and activated voxels. For the contrast 3PP>1PP the following coordinates were taken to 
generate ROIs: left inferior frontal cortex (x=-42 45 0), right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(middle frontal gyurs) (x=39, y=24, z=27), left inferior parietal cortex (x = -36, y = -57, z = 
39), right precuneus (x=6, y=-69, z= 39), and right inferior parietal cortex (x=39, y=-48, 
z=45) . For the contrast 1PP>3PP the following coordinates were taken to create ROIs:  left 
posterior cingulate cortex (x=-3. y=-33, z= 42 and x=-6, y=-54, z=21), anterior cingulate cor-
tex (x=0, y=15, z=-6), left medial prefrontal cortex (x=-9, y=48, z= 9), left middle frontal cor-
tex (x=-24 y=39 z=39), left superior parietal lobule (x=-27, y=-87, z=42), right parahippo-
campal gyrus (x=36, y=54, z=0) and left middle temporal gyrus (x=-57, y=-66, z=21). For 
statistical analysis we used a repeated measure ANOVA with the within-subject factor per-
spective (1PP, 3PP) and the between-subject factor group (children, adults) for each ROI. To 
look after the potential effect of similarity between participants and Paul on brain responses, 
we correlated the ratings obtained from the participants with each ROI.  
To examine whether the differences between children and adults in brain activation are caused 
by maturation rather than by performance differences in reaction times between groups, we 
separated the groups in good and bad performers. Using the median of reaction time perform-
ance for 3PP-judgments in both groups we built four groups. Thereafter brain activity within 
each ROI was analyzed using a repeated measure ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 3PP) as 
within-subject factor and age (adults, children) and performance (good-performer, bad-
performer) as between-subject factors.  
Current techniques of data analysis (e.g. SPM random effect second-level analysis) allow the 
identification of common areas of brain activation within a population. Since higher inter-
individual variability is a principle characteristic of a developing population, we compared 
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intersubject-variability of brain activation between children and adults. To visualize the inter-
subject variability in location of brain activation we build probability maps in each group. A 
probability map is a measure of the spatial consistency of brain activation and shows how 
many subjects activated a particular voxel (Xiong et al., 2000). This technique allows for the 
identification of activation that is missed by group averaging and indicates what portion of the 
study population contributes to the overall group. To calculate the probability map for each 
group, we used one-sample T-maps for the contrast 3PP>1PP from each participant (threshold 
p<0.05, uncorrected). Using MRIcroN (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron) we built 
the color scale that represents the percentage of subjects who activated for each voxel (rang-
ing from 15%-100%). To further analyze the variability of brain activity, we estimated the 
nearest local maxima for each ROI-coordinate in each subject and calculated the standard 
deviation along the x-, y-, and z-coordinates of each group. The nearest individual local 
maxima had to be within the left parietal cortex for the ROI in the left inferior parietal cortex, 
the left and right precuneus for the ROI in the precuneus and in the right parietal cortex for 
the ROI in the right inferior parietal cortex. Otherwise it was excluded from analysis. Euclid-
ean distance values d around the mean location (x0, y0, z0) for each selected ROI were also 
calculated for each subject using the following equation 
(xi-x0)2+(yi-y0)2+(zi-z0)2 
where x, y, and z are coordinates in MNI space for each individual (i). The Mann-Whitney U-
Test was used to test for group differences in each ROI (p<0.05), because it is insensitive to 
the assumption of independence of each coordinate. It is also more robust against violations of 
a normal distribution of population.  
 
5.4. Results 
Behavioral Data  
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Judgments 
Figure 2a shows the participants’ judgments for the four conditions. With the selection of ac-
tivities with and without social interaction (with, no SI) we provoked differences in judgment 
for self and other conditions. The results (Figure 1) show that both adult and child participants 
understood the task and performed successfully in terms of their appreciation of Paul’s prefer-
ences: in the conditions where they had to judge whether Paul would like to do activities with 
social interactions their answers lay in the negative range whereas the answers for activities 
without interactions lay on the positive range. Repeated measures ANOVA with perspective 
(1PP, 3PP) and type of task (with SI, no SI) as within-subject factors and group (adults, chil-
dren) as a between subjects factor revealed significant main effects of perspective 
(F(1,22)=42.24, p<0.0001) and type of task (F(1,22)=25.88, p<0.0001). There was no interac-
tion between group and any condition (all F(1,22)<0.144, p>0.707).  
 
 
Figure 2: A) This figure shows participants’ judgments (mean and standard error) according the first-person and 
third-person perspective (1PP, 3PP) for activities with and without social interaction (with/no SI). B) Reaction 
times in msec for 1PP and 3PP and reaction time differences between 3PP and 1PP judgments are shown. 
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Reaction times 
Response times for judgments were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with per-
spective (1PP, 3PP) and type of task (with SI, no SI) as within-subject factors and group 
(adults, children) as a between subjects factor. There was a main effect for perspective 
(F(1,22) = 27.4, p<0.0001), which indicated that judgments were made more slowly when 
participants had to answer according to the 3PP than when they had to answer for themselves. 
We further found a significant interaction between perspective and group (F(1,22) =5.7, p< 
0.026). Since there was no significant interaction between factors type of task (with SI, no SI) 
and perspective (1PP, 3PP) nor between the factors type of task and the group (children, 
adults) we collapsed trials with and without social interaction. Post hoc analysis showed that 
the difference between reaction times for 1PP and 3PP judgments (was significantly greater in 
children than in adults (p=0.03, mean adults: 109 msec, mean children: 292 msec) and de-
creased significantly with age (r=-0.043, p<0.05) (Figure 2b). 
 
Neuroimaging Results   
Main effect perspective: contrast 3PP versus 1PP judgments in children 
Children showed enhanced activation in the parietal and frontal lobes during judgments for 
another person as compared with judgments for themselves (Table 1).  
Within the parietal lobe, they activated the right and left inferior parietal cortex (BA 40), the 
post-central gyrus (BA 3) and the right precuneus (BA 7) and, within the frontal lobe, the 
right dorsolateral prefrontal (middle frontal gyrus, BA 9) and the left inferior prefrontal cortex 
(BA 46) and sublobar the right insula (BA 47) (Figure 3b).  
Main effect perspective: contrast 3PP versus 1PP judgments in adults 
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 In adults, the right precuneus (BA 7) and the left inferior parietal cortex (BA 40) were more 
activated during 3PP judgments than during 1PP judgments. No other areas showed signifi-
cant activation.  
Main effect perspective: contrast 1PP versus 3PP judgments  
In children, the main effect of 1PP versus 3PP judgments revealed activation in the left ante-
rior cingulate cortex (BA 32). Adults additionally activated the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 
23, 24), left middle frontal gyrus (BA 8), and the left inferior parietal gyrus (BA 40).  
 
Interactions: perspective by age-group 
Voxel-based whole-brain analysis revealed no significant brain activation for the interaction 
between perspective and group. We therefore performed ROI analysis.  
Comparisons between children and adults 
For the ROI analysis we took the activation pattern from the main effect 3PP versus 1PP 
judgments for all participants together as described in the methods. As can be seen in Figure 
3c, adults and children showed comparable brain activity in all ROIs formed from the differ-
ence between 3PP and 1PP judgments, except for the right middle frontal cortex and in the 
right inferior parietal cortex. Using repeated measures ANOVA with the factor perspective 
(1PP, 3PP) and the between-subject factor group (children, adults) the statistical analyses re-
vealed a significant interaction between group and perspective in right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (middle frontal gyrus) (F(1,22)=4.27, p<0.05) and the right inferior parietal cortex 
(F(1,22)=4.14, p<0.05), but not in the other ROIs (all F(1,22)<0.274 p>0.05). The compari-
son between children and adults for the ROIs from the contrast 1PP versus 3PP judgment 
yielded no significant main effect of group (all F(1,22)<1.68, p>0.208 group interaction with 
any of the ROIs (all F(1,22)<3.515, p>0.074 ). We further analyzed the effect of similarity 
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between the participants and Paul by correlating the ratings of similarity with percent signal 
change within each ROI. None of the ROIs correlated with similarity (all r<0.329).  
Comparison between good and bad performers  
To examine whether the differences between children and adults in brain activation are pre-
dominantly caused by maturation effects or by performance differences between groups, we 
separated the groups into good and a bad performers (see methods). Brain activity within each 
ROI was analyzed using a repeated measure ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 3PP) as within-
subject factor and age (adults, children) and performance (good-performer, bad-performer) as 
between-subject factors. Statistical analysis revealed no significant two-way and three-way 
interaction with performance in any brain region (all two-way interactions: F(1,20)< 1.41, 
p>0.248) and  all three-way interactions: F(1,20)< 3.14, p>0.092).  
 
Figure 3 A-C: A-B) Theses figures show the main effect of 3PP versus 1PP judgments for all participants to-
gether. Statistical maps are thresholded at p<0.005 and overlaid on a canonical T1 anatomical image. The signal 
change (%) and standard error of 1PP (light grey) and 3PP (dark grey) in the ROIs of the left parietal gyrus (x=-
36, y=-57, z=39)), precuneus (6, -69, 39), right parietal gyrus (39 -48 45), the left inferior frontal cortex (x=-42, 
y=45, z=0) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x=39, y=24, z=27). Adults and children are shown sepa-
rately. Significant interactions (*) between perspective and group thresholded at p<0.05.  
C) This figure shows the main effect of 3PP versus 1PP for children (yellow), adults (red) and the overlap be-
tween children and adults (orange). 
 
Figure 4a shows the probability maps for the contrast 3PP versus 1PP. The probability-maps 
suggest that children deploy a more extended neural network than adults. Within the frontal 
  38 
cortex, the activation seems to become more focal with development and in the more posterior 
regions we can see a shift from bilateral to unilateral left parietal activation. For the ROIs 
within the frontal lobule, we could not calculate the variability in location of individual local 
maxima because we had to exclude 5 from 12 adults since they did not show activity within 
the frontal lobule for the contrast 3PP>1PP. For the ROIs in the parietal lobule, the variability 
in location of individual local maxima did not seem to differ between groups (Figure 4b). We 
had to exclude six participants from the analysis because their data did not yield activation 
within our predefined search range (see methods): three within the left inferior parietal cortex 
(2 children, 1 adult), one within the precuneus (1 adult) and two within the right inferior pa-
rietal cortex (2 adults). If at all, adults showed a larger variation than children in the right pa-
rietal cortex. 
This observation was confirmed in the analysis of the mean Euclidean distance values. The 
distances varied in these ROIs from 9.1 to 20.5 mm (see Fig. 4c). The Mann-Whitney U-Test 
showed no significant difference in Euclidean distances between the two groups in the left 
inferior parietal cortex (p>0.76, 2-tailed) and the precuneus (p>0.109, 2-tailed). Within the 
right inferior parietal cortex we found a tendency for a group difference in the Euclidian dis-
tance (p<0.066), indicating that adults showed larger variability (22.5 mm) than children (14.4 
mm). 
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Table 1: Peaks of Activity in Children and Adults during Direct Comparison of 1PP- and 3PP Processing 
 
 
 
Clusters in a priori regions of interest and survive a threshold of p<0.005 for magnitude, k>5 voxels; All other clusters sur-
vive a threshold of p<0.05; k>10 voxels FWE corrected. BA=putative Brodmann's area; x, y, z =MNI coordinates; k=number 
of voxels in a cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   MNI 
coordinates 
  
Contrast  Area BA X y z t- 
value 
k 
3PP >1PP Precuneus 31 21 -57 30 3.95 20 
Children Inferior parietal gyrus 40 36 -39 42 3.82 28 
  40 -36 -57 39 3.60 19 
 Post-central gyrus 3 57 -18 33 3.39 8 
 Middle frontal gryrus 9 48 27 33 3.71 37 
  Insula 13 33 21 0 3.33 5 
Adults precuneus 7 3 -72 48 4.24 81 
  Inferior parietal gyrus 7 -33 -63 42 3.25 6 
1PP > 3PP        
Children Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 -3 45 0 4.49 20 
 Brainstem  3 -39 -39 4.32 10 
Adults Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 -6 45 15 5.03 22
1 
  24 9 27 15 4.10 9 
 Cingulate gyrus 24 9 3 24 3.96 6 
  32 -15 3 42 3.35 5 
 Posterior cingulate gyrus 23 -12 -51 18 3.78 14 
 Middle frontal gyrus 8 18 -15 63 3.74 39 
 Inferior parietal gyrus 40 -57 -30 24 3.59 8 
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Figure. 4A-C: A) This figure shows the probability maps thresholded at p<0.05 and overlaid an a canonical T1 
anatomical image for children and adults separately for the contrast 3PP-1PP.  
B) This figure shows the inter-subject variability in locations of activation (mm) for each region of interest 1) 
left inferior parietal cortex (x= -36, y=-57, z=39; 2) precuneus (6, -69, 39); and right inferior parietal cortex (39, 
-48, 45). Each bar graph represents one standard deviation in x-, y-, and z-coordinates. C) Each bar graph repre-
sents the average Euclidean distance (mm) around the mean location for each brain region. The error bars repre-
sent standard errors. 
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5.5. Discussion 
Brain activation during participants’ reasoning about another person’s mind was compared 
with brain activity when they reflected upon their own preferences Reasoning about others, 
and understanding what they think, what they feel or what they believe involves stepping into 
their ‘mental shoes’ and taking their perspective. The ability to understand other people’s 
mind and realize that they can have different perspectives is commonly referred to as having a 
“theory of mind”. It requires the ability to distinguish ‘self” from ‘other’ and appreciate an-
other’s person intentions, beliefs or preferences.  
We would argue that cognitive perspective taking becomes increasingly efficient (decrease of 
RT between 3PP and 1PP) after the age at which classic theory of mind tasks are accom-
plishable. Additionally, development of cognitive perspective taking shows changes in brain 
activity within a neural network involving particularly posterior parietal regions but also pre-
frontal brain areas. We would further argue that increased efficiency in perspective taking 
during development is supported by a focalization of the neural network involved. In contrast 
to previous imaging studies on cognitive development we were able to show by using meas-
ures of inter-subject variability analysis that children activated a coherent but more extended 
neural network during judgments for others than adults.  
 
Maturation accompanies increased efficacy in perspective taking 
There is currently considerable debate about the way in which we switch viewpoints from 
oneself to another person in everyday social interaction. According to the simulation theory, 
we place ourselves in another person’s position by asking what we might believe or desire in 
a similar situation and simulate them (Taylor et al., 1994). Alternatively, the “theory-theory” 
claims that that we use a common sense psychological theory to understand other people’s 
mind, rather than internally simulating them (Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997). However, when 
taking another person’s perspective it is not always sufficient only to simulate what I myself 
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would do in the other person’s situation. I need to imagine what the other person would do in 
her or his situation. In addition to ‘putting ourselves in another person’s shoes’ we therefore 
need to distinguish our own preferences from another person’s intentions or preferences. Our 
behavioral data indicate that all participants, irrespective of age, inhibited their own egocen-
tric perspective and mentally stepped outside their viewpoint to adopt the other person’s pref-
erences. Thus, in respect of this debate the ability to appreciate Paul’s preferences appropri-
ately cannot only be explained by the simulation theory.  To appraise Paul’s preferences ap-
propriately participants need to develop a ‘theory ‘about the mind of a person like Paul. 
 
Despite the qualitatively equivalent performance between children and adults, we quantita-
tively found a significant interaction in reaction times between group and perspective, which 
indicated that differences between self and other judgments decrease with age. The reaction 
time differences could not have been due to any differences in stimuli since we presented the 
same stimuli in both conditions. Several studies in adults have reported longer reaction times 
for 3PP than for 1PP (D'argembeau et al., 2007; David et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2004), al-
though in some studies the differences were not significant (Ruby, 2003, 2004). In this con-
text Choudhury and colleagues recently compared 3PP and 1PP reaction time differences be-
tween children, adolescents and adults (Choudhury et al., 2006). They also found a significant 
decrease in reaction time differences with age but in contrast to our findings the difference 
between 3PP and 1PP spread almost equally in both directions (3PP>1PP and 1PP>3PP), 
whereas none of our children showed faster reaction time for 3PP than for 1PP. Taken to-
gether, our behavioral results indicate that perspective taking in children seems to be gener-
ally established, but that their way of processing is less proficient than in adults.  
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Neural development of perspective taking 
The focus of the present study was the development of the neural bases for processing other 
person’s mental perspectives. The present data for 1PP processing are in good accordance 
with studies on neural correlates related to the self-processing and with self- perspective stud-
ies (Damasio et al., 2000; Piefke et al., 2003; Vogeley et al., 2004). Since we did not find any 
developmental differences in brain activity related to 1PP processing, subsequently only brain 
activation that is associated with 3PP processing will be discussed.  
For 3PP compared to 1PP processing, adults activated the precuneus and the left inferior pa-
rietal cortex. Children additionally activated the left inferior frontal cortex, the right dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex and the right parietal cortex. The significant interaction between age 
and perspective n the right dorsolateral prefrontal and in the right inferior parietal cortex indi-
cates that these cortical regions play an important role in the development of perspective tak-
ing.  
An increasing number of imaging (Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003, 2004; Saxe, 2006; Saxe et al., 
2005) and lesion studies in adults (Samson et al., 2004) point to the importance of the poste-
rior parietal regions in relation to perspective taking. It has been proposed that the inferior 
parietal cortex is critical for the ability to distinguish between self and other (Decety et al., 
2003b). This region was specifically involved when participants imagined another person 
being the agent of an action, imagined how another person feels in a given situation, what 
another person thinks or how another person experiences pain but not when they imagined 
these situations for themselves (Jackson et al., 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001, 2003, 2004). Sev-
eral studies in adults reported that the inferior parietal cortex in the right hemisphere was 
mainly involved in perspective taking whereas others found it more in the left hemisphere 
(David et al., 2006; Vogeley et al., 2004). Even clinical neuropsychology reported mixed 
findings. Samson and colleagues (Samson, 2004) reported evidence from three brain-damaged 
patients that the left TPJ is necessary for reasoning about other person’s mind, while Blanke 
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and colleagues (Blanke, 2002) referred to the importance of the right hemisphere. In the latter 
study direct cortical stimulation of this region induced an out-of-body experience, which is a 
3PP of oneself. So far the contribution of each parietal lobule is still unclear since lateraliza-
tion effects have not been investigated systematically. However, two recent studies demon-
strated a selective impairment of self-other distinctions when repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) was applied over the right inferior parietal lobule as participants performed 
a perceptual task involving discrimination between photographs of themselves and of a famil-
iar face (Uddin et al., 2006). Self-other judgments on whole arm reaching movements 
(Preston et al., 2008) were also impaired when TMS was applied over the right but not over 
the left inferior parietal cortex. The additional 3PP specific activation in the right IPL in chil-
dren compared with adults might therefore indicate that children need more self-other dis-
crimination during 3PP processing than adults. 
In comparison to adults, children additionally activated prefrontal brain regions during the 
processing of another person’s perspective. The significant interaction between age and acti-
vation in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex indicated that only children specifically acti-
vated the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during 3PP.   
Even though there are only a few studies on the development of the neural network underly-
ing social cognitive processes, several authors reported a decrease of frontal activation with 
age. Using a similar task, Pfeiffer et al. (Pfeifer et al., 2007) found the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC) more activated in children than in adults while they reported whether short 
phrases described themselves or a highly familiar other person (Harry Potter). Another neuro-
imaging study found that the mPFC was more active in adolescents than in adults while par-
ticipants were thinking about their own intention compared to thinking about physical causal-
ity (Blakemore et al., 2007). Because both of these studies focused on self-related processing 
comparison with our results is limited. Wang and colleagues investigated the development of 
the ability to understand irony, which requires the ability to separate the literal meaning of a 
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comment from its intended meaning. Again, children and adolescents activated the mPFC and 
the left inferior frontal gyrus more than adults (Wang et al., 2006, 2007).  
Thus, the present findings seem to be in line with the previous developmental studies in terms 
of the decrease of prefrontal brain activation. However, in contrast to the reported findings we 
mainly observed a decrease in activation within dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in-
stead of medial prefrontal cortex. The DLPFC is known to play a critical role in executive 
function, particularly in cognitive control (Aron et al., 2004; Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge et al., 
2002; Fecteau et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 2006; Menon et al., 2001). From 
developmental psychology we know that higher cognitive control and attention functions de-
velop long into adolescence (Davidson et al. 2006). Interestingly several social psychological 
studies have demonstrated that even adults frequently use self-knowledge as the primary basis 
for developing a model of what others know and feel, which has been described as a default 
mode of reasoning about others’ mind. This egocentric bias can be interpreted as failure to 
suppress one’s own perspective (Gilovich et al., 2002; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman et al., 
2003; Vorauer et al., 1999). Considering this background the 3PP specific activation of the 
DLPFC in children may indicate that processing a 3PP requires children more than adults to 
inhibit their own prepotent egocentric perspective while they reason about Paul’s perspective. 
 
A possible explanation for the differences in brain activation in children compared to adults is 
cortical maturation, in particular grey matter reorganization and white matter increase 
throughout adolescence and early adulthood. Since the prefrontal cortex and the inferior parie-
tal cortex are among the last brain regions to mature (Gogtay et al., 2004) it is plausible that 
these region contains less well functioning connections, leading to more activation for tasks 
that recruit them. Alternatively one can argue that more attention is needed by children to 
perform the task (judge according to Paul). Since we did not find performance related differ-
ences in brain activation we can rule out this argument.  
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In addition to the frontal and parietal cortex we found the precuneus to be specifically in-
volved in 3PP processing in children and even more pronouncedly in adults. Several perspec-
tive taking studies found that the precuneus was activated during perspective taking. Its poste-
rior part, which we found to be involved in 3PP processing, has recently been found to be 
preferentially activated during recollection of imagined rather than viewed items (Lundstrom 
et al., 2005). Since participants did not personally know Paul and due to the fact that the story 
about him did not contain any explicit hint about how to answer the questions, they really had 
to imagine Paul’s preferences rather than retrieve information from memory. The precuneus is 
also known as part of the so called “default network”: A network of brain structures (includ-
ing medial frontal, parietal and temporal areas) displaying the highest metabolic rates when 
participants are at rest but are ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks (Gusnard et al., 
2001; Raichle et al., 2001). However, in the context of our results its worth mentioning that 
there is a remarkable overlap between brain areas typically involved in social cognitive tasks 
and the ‘default system’. Thus, it has been argued that the resemblance of brain regions en-
gaged in social cognition as well as during “resting states” suggest that human beings might 
have a predisposition for social cognition to which they return when not explicitly forced to 
an effortful task (Schilbach et al., 2008). At this point we refer to Cavanna (2006) for review 
about the precuneus and its functional and behavioral correlates (Cavanna et al., 2006) and at 
Schilbach (2008) for an excellent overview about the relation between the default and the 
social cognitive networks of the brain.  
 
Intersubject variablity in location of brain activity 
Previous neuroimaging studies on development, reported similar patterns of neural activation 
among children and adults, whilst children convey more distributed patterns of neural activa-
tion and a decrease of BOLD signal as compared to adults. Such a change in patterns of neu-
ral activity has been referred to as a focalization of neural development (Casey et al., 2005; 
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Durston et al., 2006). The usual explanation for greater variation in neural activity across 
brain regions is that cognitive strategies are less efficient in children, whereas enhanced activ-
ity in focal brain areas during maturation has been interpreted as being due to increased effi-
ciency and neural pruning. A problem, however, with interpreting focalization in brain imag-
ing is that differences in neural activity can be confounded by differences in variability be-
tween groups: a more heterogeneous or incoherent pattern of neural activity not only leads to 
a more distributed network but also to a reduction of neural activity. Thus, to determine if 
focalization of neural activity during maturation occurs, one has to disentangle measures of 
variance and measures of signal change (Berl et al., 2006; Xiong et al., 2000).  
The probability-maps (figure 3a) showed that children deploy a more extended neural net-
work than adults. Probability maps provide support for a developmental shift from frontal to 
posterior and from bilateral to unilateral within parietal activation. Since 5 adults did not show 
any frontal brain activation for the contrast 3PP>1PP, the comparison of the inter-subject 
variability in location of frontal brain activity between children and adults could not be calcu-
lated (figure 3b-c). In parietal areas, we found no indication for lower activation in children, 
while the probability maps indicate that children activate a more extended network than 
adults. Additionally, children showed a similar (or even reduced) degree of variance in the 
distribution of local maxima in neural activity as compared with adults. These findings sug-
gest that children activated a coherent but more extended neural network of activity. This pat-
tern of neural development is compatible with the hypothesis that an immature network has 
extensive activation because the network is not fully pruned. The findings do not support hy-
potheses on diffuse and dispersive networks in children, as has been suggested for different 
tasks (Berl, 2006, Durston, 2006).  
Three potential weaknesses of the study should be mentioned: first, the significance of the 
study may be hampered due to the small sample sizes of the two groups. Second, the ability of 
taking another person’s perspective may depend on the similarity or dissimilarity, respec-
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tively, of that person to the own personality, which might have an impact on brain activation. 
We obtained the degree of similarity only by asking participants how much they feel alike 
Paul generally and did not find any significant correlations.  For further studies, it would be 
interesting to explore the degree of similarity in more detail (for example by using a question-
naire) and investigate how it influences the ability to reason according to a third-person’s per-
spective in children and adults and furthermore to explore its effect on brain activation. In this 
context Mitchell (Mitchell et al., 2006) could show that a region in the mPFC linked to self-
referential thoughts was activated during judgments according the perspective of a similar 
other person but not according a dissimilar other person. The overlap between judgments of 
self and a similar other person suggest that participants can use knowledge about themselves 
to infer the mental states of similar others. Moreover, since children show more difficulties in 
cognitive control, it would be interesting to explore the degree of self-suppression during per-
spective taking in dependence of the similarity to the other person. Third, according to 
Kriegeskorte (Kriegeskorte et al., 2009) there is a certain danger to commit a type I error by 
using the same dataset for statistical analysis and generating ROIs. Since we only built ROIs 
1) after verifying our hypotheses about the brain location associated with processing a third-
person’s perspective (prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex) and 2) for each significant 
cluster (there was no selection of clusters) we argue for the present approach. There would 
have been the possibility to built ROIs according to the literature to test our hypothesis. Since 
we were especially interested in developmental effects and there is no developmental study 
investigating perspective taking in children or adolescents, we would have missed important 
information by generating ROIs according to the adult literature. We nevertheless additionally 
performed a ROI analysis according to the literature. An adult study for our hypothesis about 
the parietal cortex brain activation and a developmental study for the hypothesis about the 
prefrontal cortex activation were used. The results confirmed our findings about the decrease 
of prefrontal cortex activation with age. In contrast to our ROI analysis in the right inferior 
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parietal cortex there was no significant interaction between perspective and age-groups in the 
ROI of the right inferior parietal cortex based on the literature (see supplementary materials).   
We conclude that the neuronal network underlying perspective taking is generally established 
in eight year old children: 1) because children showed no more variance within the adult neu-
ral network, 2) because the more widespread activation patterns cannot be explained by 
greater inter-subject variance in children, 3) because the variability between areas within the 
children’s network did not differ, and 4) differences in neural activity can be attributed to 
maturation, not to performance differences between adults and children. Children use a coher-
ent but larger neural network to solve the task. One might speculate that children have not yet 
developed a specific approach to infer the perspective of others and thereby activated addi-
tional regions. Since adults are more experienced in social interaction with a variety of differ-
ent personalities and thus are more skilled in perspective taking, they may have developed 
specific “modules” and use an efficient strategy to think about Paul’s preferences, which pre-
sumably has been learned and reinforced from past experiences.  
Taken together this is the first study on cognitive perspective taking in children that reveals 
the development of neural networks beyond the age of eight years. From developmental psy-
chology studies we know that higher order cognitive function such as cognitive control devel-
ops into adolescence and is relevant in relation to a number of developmental disorders. The 
development of perspective taking abilities beyond six years of age is much less investigated, 
although respectful and considerate behavior cannot emerge without a sophisticated under-
standing of other people’s perspectives. 
 The developmental differences we observed in this study cannot be attributed to qualitative 
performance differences since the behavioral output is the same in both age groups, but it 
seems that the children’s strategy is less efficient (longer reaction times). Furthermore, we 
have been able to specify that neural development of perspective taking accompanies a shift 
of brain activity from frontal to posterior brain regions and from bilateral to unilateral left 
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brain activation in the parietal lobule. This supports and extends the focalization model of 
neural development. Since the additionally activated right inferior parietal cortex in children 
did not show more inter-subject variability than the other brain areas, we conclude that chil-
dren use a qualitatively different, but coherent network.  
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6  Adopting another person’s mind: girls and boys neural 
development of cognitive perspective taking2 
Dosch M, Loenneker T, Klaver P*, Martin E* 
* authors equally contributed 
 
6.1. Abstract 
Adolescence is characterized by a transitional period of physical and psychological changes. 
The neural basis of these developmental changes is controversially discussed, particularly in 
the light of male and female development. Here, we investigated the neural development of 
perspective taking in children, young adolescents and adults of both genders by comparing 
brain activity during judgments from a third-person’s perspective (3PP) with judgments from 
the first-person perspective (1PP). Behaviorally, children, adolescents and adults did not dif-
fer in appreciating a 3PP but the reaction times for 3PP versus 1PP judgments differed be-
tween pubescent girls and boys. Functional brain imaging results revealed pronounced activa-
tion of a fronto-parietal network during 3PP as opposed to 1PP judgments. Furthermore, we 
observed developmental gender-differences within this network. Whereas in females the de-
velopment of the functional network was characterized by a decrease in activity in the right 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, changes in laterality within the inferior parietal cortex were 
observed in males. These results warrant the conclusion that neural development of social 
cognition differs between males and females, which is particularly striking during adoles-
cence.  
                                            
 
 
2 Article submitted to Journal of Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience  
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6.2. Introduction 
Humans are social beings. The human ability of mutual understanding and to predict the ac-
tions of others is essential for successful social interaction. A central mechanism of social 
understanding is the ability to step into other peoples ‘mental shoes’ and reason according to 
their perspective to understand what they think, feel or belief. In the present study we investi-
gate the ability to take other person’s mental perspective.  
A number of functional neuroimaging studies in adults have investigated the neural mecha-
nisms underlying the ability to represent the mental state of other people. They often com-
pared neural responses while imagining another person’s perspective (a third-person perspec-
tive; 3PP) with those during the imagination of their own perspective (first-person perspec-
tive, 1PP). Third-person’s perspective compared to one’s own perspective has been associated 
with brain activation in the inferior parietal cortex, the medial posterior cortex, i.e. the pos-
terior cingulated and the precuneus, and the prefrontal cortex (David et al., 2006; Jackson, 
Meltzoff et al., 2006; Lamm et al., 2007; Ruby et al., 2001a, 2003, 2004; Vogeley et al., 
2001).  
Recent structural MRI studies have demonstrated that the brain undergoes considerable de-
velopmental changes during adolescence. While the global grey matter (GM) volume of the 
cerebrum decreases (Giedd et al., 1999), the white matter (WM) volume increases (Giedd et 
al., 1999; Paus, 2005). Moreover, a region-specific developmental decrease in GM volume 
has been reported in frontal, parietal and temporal areas (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 
2004; Sowell et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2002; Wilke et al., 2007), which differs between boys 
and girls. Theses changes in frontal and parietal cortices occur one to two years earlier in boys 
than boys. In this context it has recently been suggested that the development of the adoles-
cent brain might respond differently to changing levels of testosterone and estradiol. E.g. it 
could be demonstrated that the levels of sex steroids in children between 8 and 15 years of age 
were associated with sexual dimorphic gray matter areas (Neufang et al., 2009). The reported 
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neuroanatomical changes during adolescence may reflect a refinement of neuronal connec-
tions that could be related to cognitive and emotional development. It can be further hypothe-
sized that functions that relay on these brain regions would also show developmental changes 
during this time period.  
 
Given the fact that brain imaging studies on perspective taking in adults have identified the 
importance of a fronto-parietal network and that structural studies have demonstrated devel-
opmental changes of these regions to continue until early adulthood and to differ between 
girls and boys, we hypothesize developmental differences in the neural network underlying 
cognitive perspective taking between genders.  
To test this hypothesis we scanned 12 children, 11 young adolescents and 12 adults of both 
sexes. They were required to make judgments on leisure activities for themselves (1PP) or for 
another person (3PP). Leisure activities are much more self-defining during adolescence than 
school activities because they provide more opportunity for self-direction and initiative. Dur-
ing the task short statements of real life situations were presented to both adults and children, 
who were required to make judgments for themselves and for another person.  
Since brain imaging studies on perspective taking in adults pointed the importance of the 
fronto-parietal network and structural studies showed that this network is not fully developed 
until early adulthood we expected that the neural development of perspective taking is associ-
ated with changes in brain activation within the prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal cor-
tex. Moreover, given that structural studies reported differential neural development across 
males and females we were especially interested in gender-specific developmental differ-
ences.  
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6.3. Methods 
Participants 
Data were acquired from 12 children (aged 8.5-10.6 years, mean 9.9, 6 females), 11 young 
adolescents (aged 11.8-13.1 years, mean 12.6, 5 females) and 12 adults (aged 24.6-32.3 years, 
M=29.1, 8 females). Four additional children and two male adults had to be excluded due to 
extensive movement during the fMRI scanning (>5mm) and were therefore also excluded 
from behavioral analysis. All children were recruited from public schools in the city of Zu-
rich. Participants completed the German version of the autism-spectrum quotient question-
naire for adults or for children (AQ, Baron-Cohen, 2006) – a quantitative self-report instru-
ment for assessing how many autistic traits a person has. None of the participants scored 
above the critical minimum of 30 out of 50 autistic traits (children: m=18.73, sd=5.10; adoles-
cents: m=14.3, sd= 6.65; adults m=16.35, sd=4.56). No significant group differences 
(t(2,32)=,1.74, p=0.192) or sex differences were found (t(1,32)=0.054, p=0.818). Participants 
were also asked to indicate on an analogous scale (ranging from 0-100) how much they felt 
like Paul irrespective of sex. Female and males did not differ in their ratings (males: m=17.00, 
sd=19.80; females: m=15.06, sd=12.636 F(1,33)=1.22, p=0.73) but there was a significant 
group difference (children: m=29.92, sd= 18.50; adolescents: m=3.10, sd=2.28; adults: 
m=13.75, sd=8.27), F(1,33)=14.76, p<0.0001). All participants were right-handed as assessed 
by the Edinburgh Inventory Scale (Oldfield, 1971). None of the participants had a significant 
history of medical, psychiatric or neurological disorders on the basis of self- or parent-report. 
None of the participants used any neurotropic or psychotropic medication. Written informed 
consent was obtained from all participants, as well as written informed parental consent for 
child participants. The study was approved by the local ethics committee and conducted in 
accordance with the guidelines set out in the Helsinki Declaration 
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Task Description 
Children and adolescents were introduced to the “other child” by reading a story about Paul a 
child with autistic behavior; adults likewise learned about a grown-up person with autistic 
behavior. During the fMRI measurement, the task required participants to make judgments 
about 32 leisure activities for themselves or for Paul. Activities with and without social inter-
actions (with SI, no SI) were chosen to provoke differences in judgment for the 1PP and 3PP 
condition (assuming that Paul would dislike all social interactions). Separate task versions 
were created for children and for adults. The task employed a design in which the type of 
stimulus and the perspective taken by the participants was manipulated. In the 1PP condition, 
subjects were asked to evaluate how much they like to do certain activities. In 3PP condition, 
subjects were instructed to imagine Paul and answer according to his preferences and interests 
and to ignore their own. In all trials, subjects were presented first with a picture if themselves 
or of Paul (duration 2 seconds) to indicate the perspective they had to adopt for answering the 
upcoming question. Subsequently, a sentence (e.g. ‘going to a friend’s birthday party’ or 
‘reading a book’) was presented in black on a grey background (duration 6 seconds) together 
with a slider for answering, followed by a fixation cross (500 ms). Sixteen null-events in 
which only a fixation cross was shown were included and presented randomly. Participants 
were required to make their judgment by pressing the left or right button with the middle or 
index finger of their right hand. The button press moved a red marker on a slide on a continu-
ous scale from left “I don’t like to do this activity at all” to right “I like to do this activity very 
much” (the scale range was from -100 to +100 with no visible scale in between). The longer 
the left/right button is pressed, the more the slider moves to the left/right side of the scale. The 
starting point of the red marker on the continuous scale was presented randomly. Each of the 
four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no SI, 3PP with SI, 3PP no SI) consisted of 16 trials which 
had to be judged according to both perspectives (total 64 trials). The sequence of the trials 
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was generated randomly for each participant. Each activity had to be judged for them selves 
as well as for Paul. 
 
Experimental Procedure 
Before the scanning session we introduced the participants to “the other person”, Paul. Then, 
they were instructed to learn about the other person by reading a story about the history of a 
male child, or adult with autistic behavior describing his social behavior and academic skills 
as well as his interests. Participants did not know that Paul has the diagnosis of Asperger 
Syndrom. We used different versions for adults and children. The difference between histories 
was that Paul’s biography continued until adulthood for adults, but stopped at childhood (ca. 
10 years) for the children. Similarly, the photograph of Paul was adapted to the age of the 
participants. The story comprised 200 words for children and 293 for adults. Participants were 
then asked to retell the story and answer several questions to ensure that they understood cor-
rectly and could imagine the Paul’s personality. After introducing participant to Paul we care-
fully instructed them in the whole fMRI procedure and explained the task. Participants then 
practiced 5 trials from the 1PP and 5 from the 3PP. We again emphasized that it was very 
important to really try to imagine Paul and that we were interested in seeing how their brain 
works while they are thinking of him. We used MR-compatible video goggles to present the 
stimuli and additional acoustic noise protection by headphone (MRI Audio/Video System, 
Resonance Technology, Inc., USA) throughout the examinations. The task was programmed 
by Cogent implemented under MATLAB (http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/CogentGraphics/) 
 
MRI Data acquisition and analysis 
BOLD sensitive images were collected on a 3.0 Tesla General Electric MR-scanner using a 
gradient-echo EPI-sequence with a repetition time of 2000 ms and a 64x64 matrix. Alto-
gether, 32 slices were aligned to the anterior and posterior commissure (flip angle = 50º, 
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FOV= 24cm, slice thickness per volume = 3.8mm, 360 repetitions). Secondly, a three-
dimensional T1-weighted anatomical scan (FOV = 230 mm x 198 mm x 158 mm, matrix = 
224x192x132; TR = 8.6 ms; TE = 2.1 ms) of the whole brain was acquired. Images were ana-
lyzed using SPM5 (Statistical Parametric Mapping software, Wellcome Department of Cogni-
tive Neurology, London, UK, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The fMRI data were rea-
ligned for movement correction, normalized to the SPM template with a resampled voxel size 
of 3 mm3 and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (full width at half maximum: 9mm).  
For each participant the expected hemodynamic responses at the onset of the four conditions 
were modeled by two response functions, which were a canonical hemodynamic response 
function (HRF) and its temporal derivative (Friston et al., 1998). 
The functions were convolved with the event train of stimulus onset to create covariates in a 
general linear model. Misses were modeled as a parameter of no interest. Parameter estimates 
for four conditions (1PP with SI, 1PP no SI, 3PP with SI, 3PP no SI) were obtained by maxi-
mum-likelihood estimation while using a temporal high-pass filter (cut-off 128 s) and model-
ing temporal autocorrelation as an AR(1) process. Since the neural development of perspec-
tive taking was the focus of our interest, we collapsed trials with and without social interac-
tion.  
In a voxel based analysis comparison between each condition and rest, and direct comparison 
between conditions were thresholded at p<0.05 (FWE corrected, k>10) and p<0.005 (uncor-
rected, k>5 voxels) for regions for which we had a strong a priori hypothesis, namely, the pre-
frontal and parietal cortex (Forman, 1995, Pfeiffer, 2007). 
 
To specifically look at developmental and gender-related effects of perspective taking we 
calculated a ROI analysis on basis of the activation pattern form the main effect of 3PP and 
1PP judgments. Because we have three independent groups the ROIs were based on the acti-
vation patterns across all participants (3PP>1PP), FDR corrected with a threshold of p=0.05). 
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According to these main effects 10mm spheres around each local maxima of each significant 
cluster for the contrast 3PP>1PP were created using marsbar (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). 
We did not construct any ROI from the contrast 1PP versus 3PP since the focus of our interest 
was the development of processing other people’s perspectives. Mean percent signal changes 
were taken from the raw data of every study participant for all conditions and activated voxel. 
The following coordinates: the right middle frontal gyrus (x = 45, y = 27, z = 36), the right 
posterior cingulate gyrus (x=9, y=-21, z=27), the right inferior parietal cortex (x=42, y=-51, 
z=45), the left inferior parietal cortex (x = -33, y = -60, z = 42), and the right precuneus (x = 
6, y = -69, z = 42). For statistical analysis we used a repeated measure ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factor perspective (1PP, 3PP) and the between-subject factors group (children, 
adolescents, adults) and gender (male, female) for each ROI. 
 
6.4. Results 
Behavioral Data  
Judgments 
By choosing activities with and without social interaction we evoked differences in judgment 
for self and other conditions. The results show that all participants understood the task and 
performed successfully in terms of their appreciation of Paul’s preferences. In the conditions, 
where they had to judge whether Paul would like to do activities with social interactions their 
answers lay in the negative range, whereas the answers for activities without social interac-
tions lay in the positive range. Repeated measures ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 3PP) and 
type of task (with SI, no SI) as within-subject factors and group (adult, adolescents, children) 
and gender as between subject factors revealed significant main effects of perspective 
(F(1,34)=64.5, p<0.0001) and type of task  (F(1,34)=47.0, p<0.0001). The interaction be-
tween perspective and type of task (with SI, no SI) was also significant (F(2,33)=38.0, 
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p<0.0001). There was no significant interaction with gender and any condition nor between 
age-groups and any condition all F(2,33)>1.161, p>0.290 (Figure 5a).  
 
Response times 
Response times for judgments were analyzed using a repeated measure ANOVA with the fac-
tors perspective (1PP, 3PP), and gender and age-group (children, adolescents, adults) as be-
tween subject factors. There was a main effect for perspective (F(2,33) = 31.2, p<0.0001), 
which indicated that judgments were made more slowly when participants had to answer ac-
cording to 3PP than when they had to answer for themselves. A main effect of group, 
(F(2,33)=9.7, p=0.001) demonstrates that the three groups differ in response time irrespective 
of perspectives (Figure 6b). We further found a significant interaction between perspective 
and age-groups (F(2,33)=6.6, p=0.004) indicating that adolescents show less difference in RT 
between the 3PP and the 1PP condition (RT) compared to children and adults. The addi-
tional significant threefold interaction between perspective, group and gender (F(2,33) = 3.3, 
p=0.05) shows that this effect is mainly explained by female adolescents, since they were 
equally fast for self and other (Figure 5b). 
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Figure 5A-B: A) This figure shows participants’ judgments (mean and standard error) according to the first-
person- and third-person perspective (1PP, 3PP) for activities with and without social interaction (with/no SI). B) 
Reaction times differences in msec. between 3PP and 1PP judgments are shown for female and male children, 
adolescents and adults. 
 
. 
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Neuroimaging Results   
Common brain activation in children, adolescents and adults of both sexes 
When 3PP-judgments were compared with 1PP-judgments across all participants increased 
BOLD signal changes were found in the left and right inferior parietal lobule, the right precu-
neus, the right cingulate gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
DLPFC), the medial frontal gyrus and the right insula.  
The contrast 1PP versus 3PP revealed activation in the left posterior and anterior cingulate 
gyrus, the left medial and superior frontal gyrus, the right fusiform gyrus, left parahippocam-
pal gyrus and in the basal ganglia, namely the left caudate body, the left pons (Table 2). 
Development of the network underlying perspective taking  
For the ROI analysis we took the activation pattern form the main effect 3PP versus 1PP 
judgments for all participants together as described in the methods. Using repeated measure 
ANOVA with perspective (1PP, 3PP) and ROI as within-subject factors and gender and age-
groups as between-subject factors (for details see methods) the statistical analysis revealed a 
significant interactions between ROI and age-groups (F(2,33)=3.8, p=0.034), a threefold in-
teraction between ROI, perspective and gender (F(1,34)=7.6, p=0.010) and a trend towards a 
threefold interaction between ROI, perspective and age-groups (F(2,34)=2.6, p=0.091). 
Therefore we did further post hoc analysis on each ROI with a significant main effect of per-
spective separately.  
 
In the middle frontal cortex, there was a significant interaction between perspective and age-
group (F(2,33)=3.24, p=0.05) and an almost significant threefold interaction between perspec-
tive, age-group and gender  (F(2,33)=3.1, p=0.06). The separate analysis of male and female 
participants showed that the effect of perspective in males was absent in all three age-groups. 
In females we found a main effect of perspective (more percent signal change for 3PP than for 
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1PP condition) and significant interaction between perspective and group, which indicated 
that the involvement of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) during perspective taking 
(Figure 6b) decreases with age and was absent in adult females. 
 
In the left inferior parietal cortex there was, in addition to the main effect of perspective 
(F(1,34)=5.7, p=0.023), a significant main effect of gender (F(1,34)=6.7, p=0.015) which 
indicated that females showed significantly more activity than males in this area irrespective 
of age and perspective.  
We did not find a significant main effect for perspective within the right inferior parietal cor-
tex, but the interaction between perspective and gender was significant (F(1,34)=4.8, p=0.04). 
Whereas males irrespective of their age did not activate this region during perspective taking 
(no significant main effect), females activated this region more for 3PP than for 1PP (signifi-
cant main effect of perspective (F(1,24)=5.7, p=0.04), which was especially pronounced in 
female adolescents (Figure 6). 
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Table 2: Peaks of activity in all participants during direct comparison of 1PP- and 3PP processing 
 
   MNI coordina-
tes 
  
Contrast  Area  
BA 
 
x 
 
y 
 
z 
t- 
value 
 
k 
 
3PP>1PP 
 
Left Inferior Parietal Lobule 
 
40 
 
-33 
 
-57 
 
42 
 
5.43 
 
248 
 Right Precuneus 7 6 -72 36 5.43 144 
 Right Inferior Parietal Lobule 40 42 -48 42 4.57 42 
 Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 23 9 -21 27 4.20 6 
 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 45 27 36 4.04 8 
 Right Insula* 13 33 21 0 4.25 52 
 Right Cingulate Gyrus* 23 9 -21 27 4.11 33 
 Right Medial Frontal Gyrus* 6 6 39 42 3.34 23 
        
        
1PP>3PP Left Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 23 -9 -54 18 5.83 167 
 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 -9 48 9 5.29 48 
 Left Pons  0 -39 -39 5.05 21 
 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 9 -21 36 36 4.33 26 
 Left Cerebellum  -12 -39 -9 4.23 8 
 Left Caudate Body  -15 21 15 4.21 3 
  Left Parahippocampal Gyrus 35 -27 -18 -24 4.18 17 
 Left Anterior Cingulate Gyrus* 32 -6 45 6 5.23 370 
 Right Fusiform Gyrus* 30 36 -12 -30 3.69 22 
 Left Cingulate Gyrus* 31 -21 -24 36 3.59 45 
Table 2 
p<0.05, FDR corrected, MNI coordinates (x, y, z). BA= Brodmann’s area if applicable. k= number of voxels in a 
cluster. *uncorrected, p>0.005, k>10 
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Figure: 6 A-C: A) This figure shows the main effect of 3PP versus 1PP judgments for all participants together. 
Statistical maps are thresholded at p<0.05, FDR corrected and overlaid on a canonical T1 anatomical image. B) 
This figure shows the signal change (%) and standard error of 1PP (light grey) and 3PP (dark grey) in the ROIs 
of right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (x=45, y=27, z=36) for female and male children, adolescents and adults 
separately. Significant main effects (*) for perspective are thresholded at p<0.05. C) This figure shows the signal 
change (%) and standard error of 1PP (light grey) and 3PP (dark grey) in the ROIs of left parietal cortex (x=-33, 
y=-60, z=42) and the right inferior parietal cortex (x=42, y=-51, z=45) for female and male. Significant main 
effects (*) for perspective and significant interaction between perspective and gender are thresholded at p<0.05.  
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Percent signal change in relation to reaction times in female and male children and adoles-
cents. 
Since perspective taking becomes increasingly efficient with development in males and fe-
males (decreasing RT), we analyzed how efficiency (measured by reaction time differences 
between 3PP and 1PP) is related to the development of the neural network underlying per-
spective taking in males and females. Using regression analysis between RT and percent 
signal change between 3PP and 1PP (%signal change) for each ROI, we found a significant 
regression between RT and %signal change in the DLPFC in females, which indicates 
that the longer participants had to consider 3PP in relation to 1PP the more they activated the 
frontal cortex, F(1,18)=8.55, p=0.009. In males the regression was not significant (Figure 7a). 
Since we found more bilateral inferior parietal activation in females than in males we calcu-
lated a laterality index of parietal activation and analyzed how the degree of lateralization is 
related to reaction times. The regression between RT and lateralization (%signal change 
for left and right inferior parietal cortex) in males was significant, F(1,15)=6.02, p=0.028 and 
indicated that the longer the RT for 3PP judgments compared with 1PP judgments were the 
more their parietal activation was lateralized to the left hemisphere. Females yielded no sig-
nificant regression (Figure 7b). 
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Figure 7A-B: A) This figure shows the regression analysis between RT and percent signal change between 
3PP and 1PP (%signal change) within the ROI in the DLPFC for females and males. Significant regression 
analysis in females at p<0.01. B) This figure shows the regression analysis between RT and lateralization 
(%signal change between left and right inferior parietal cortex) for females and males. Significant regression 
analysis in males at p=0.05. 
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6.5. Discussion 
This is the first study to compare the neural development of the ability to reason about other 
persons’ mind between boys and girls. The objective of this study was to investigate the neu-
ral development of perspective taking by comparing brain activation in children, adolescents 
and adults, while they reasoned about another person’s mind (3PP) versus their own prefer-
ence (1PP).  
Our data indicate that children, young adolescents and adults did not differ in appreciating 
Paul’s preferences. Despite of the equivalent qualitative performance, we quantitatively found 
gender and age-group differences in the reaction times for 3PP versus 1PP judgments.  
Moreover, when we recorded brain activities with fMRI, we observed differences in the acti-
vated neuronal networks underlying perspective taking between males and females as well as 
between age groups. Processing 3PP activated predominantly the previously described fron-
tal-parietal network across children, adolescents and adults (table 1). But our data show a dif-
ferent developmental pattern for boys and girls. More specifically, in females the develop-
ment of the functional network was characterized by a decrease of activity in the right 
DLPFC, whereas it was related to changes in laterality within the inferior parietal cortex in 
males. 
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
Only females activated the DLPFC during perspective taking and it seems that its specific role 
becomes less important with age. Although from behavioral studies there is no strong evi-
dence that perspective-taking abilities develop beyond childhood, developmental-
neuroimaging studies on social cognition in adolescents have shown that brain activity during 
social cognitive tasks continues to change during adolescence. Even though there are few 
studies on the development of the neural network underlying social cognitive processes, there 
seems to be some consistency regarding activity in the prefrontal cortex. Most of them re-
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ported a decrease in frontal brain activity with increasing age. Using a similar task, Pfeiffer et 
al. (Pfeifer et al., 2007) found the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the anterior cingulate 
cortex more activated in children than in adults during the adoption of a familiar other per-
son’s perspective (Harry Potter). Another neuroimaging-study found that the mPFC was more 
active in adolescents than in adults while participants were thinking about their own intention 
compared to thinking about physical causality (Blakemore et al., 2007). Because both of these 
studies focused on self-related processing comparison with our results is limited. Wang and 
colleagues investigated the development of the ability to understand irony. Understanding 
irony requires separating the literal meaning of a comment from its intended meaning. Again, 
children and adolescents activated the mPFC and the left inferior frontal gyrus more than 
adults (Wang et al., 2006). Compared to these findings a recent study found a decrease of pre-
frontal cortex activation within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) with increasing 
age (Dosch, 2009). The present findings seem to be in line with these finding in term of the 
decrease in DLPFC activation. While none of the reported studies investigated developmental 
gender-differences in brain activation underlying social cognitive tasks we observed a de-
crease of activation within the DLPFC which was restricted to females.   
Inferior parietal cortex 
To date little is known about developmental changes in the parietal cortex, particularly the 
inferior parietal cortex, which has been associated with processes related to social cognition in 
general and has been specifically implicated either during the processing of another person’s 
perspective relative to one’s own perspective (David et al., 2006; Jackson, Brunet et al., 2006; 
Ruby et al., 2001b; Ruby & Decety, 2003, 2004; Samson et al., 2004; Vogeley et al., 2001) or 
during imitation of another person’s actions (Decety et al., 2003).  
We found gender differences in the lateralization of brain activity between the left and the 
right parietal cortex. Whereas adults and boys as well as male adolescents showed left-
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lateralized IPC brain activation during perspective taking, girls and even more pronouncedly 
female adolescents showed bilateral IPC activation during 3PP judgments. It seems, therefore, 
that the inferior parietal cortex in the right hemisphere plays an important role in the devel-
opment of the neural network fundamental to perspective taking and that it is differently in-
volved in boys and girls. Gender differences in functional cerebral asymmetry are controversy 
discussed. A meta-analysis of imaging studies focusing on gender differences in lateralization 
quantifies gender differences as relatively small to not existent (Sommer et al., 2004) but most 
of the reported studies did not control the menstrual cycle phase in women and/or the underly-
ing sex hormones. In a recent study investigating the role of sex hormones in language later-
alization during the menstrual cycle could show dynamical and estrogen dependent differ-
ences in functional brain organization between the sexes (Weis et al., 2008). These findings 
may not be specific for language processing but might describe a more general mechanism of 
hormones mediated changes in functional brain organization.  In consideration of these find-
ings, the bilateral activation of the inferior parietal cortex during perspective-taking in girls 
and even more pronouncedly in female adolescents might be related to hormonal changes 
during development, especially since bilateral activation seems to be temporarily present and 
predominantly restricted to females.  
General discussion 
Whereas no emphasis was placed on speeded responses in the present task the data indicate 
that female and male were slower for 3PP than for 1PP in all age groups, except for female 
adolescents who were equally fast for 3PP and 1PP (Figure 6a).  
Three earlier behavioural studies found a transient change in performance in face recognition. 
Whereas performance improved constantly during the first decade of life (decrease in RT), it 
was followed by a decline in performance (rise in RT) at the onset of puberty, which in girls 
was around the age of 10-11 years and in boys 11-12 years. Performance then improved again 
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to the pre-puberty level (Blakemore, 2008; Carey et al., 1980; Diamond et al., 1983; Mcgivern 
et al., 2002). In a recent study the development of perspective-taking in adolescents was in-
vestigated using a task in which participants had to answer questions related to various scen-
arios from their own and from a protagonist’s perspective (Choudhury et al., 2006). The data 
showed that reaction time differences between 3PP and 1PP were significantly greater in pre-
adolescents but still existent in adolescents and adults, which is similar to our findings. In 
contrast to our results, however, Choudhury did not report any developmental gender differ-
ences. They concluded that decreasing RT with development represents increasing effi-
ciency in perspective-taking. In the current study we found a transient change in performance 
which indicated that female adolescents showed the best performance in processing another 
person’s perspective since they did not need more time for 3PP than for 1PP judgments. 
While none of the mentioned studies investigated the neural bases of the reported increasing 
proficiency we were able to show that decreasing RT was differently related to neural ac-
tivity in males and females. In females, shorter RT was related with less activation in the 
DLPFC and in males with a smaller degree of lateralization of the parietal cortex activation. 
Assuming that shorter RT represents higher proficiency of perspective-taking (Choudhury, 
2006), we conclude the more efficient females are, the less they need frontal regions, whereas 
the more efficient males are, the more they recruit the inferior parietal cortex of both hemi-
spheres.  
 
One might argue that changes in brain activation patterns could reflect simple performance 
differences instead of maturation as children almost always perform worse than adults on 
higher cognitive tasks. Since the task in this study was especially designed not to provoke 
performance differences (we showed that the participant’s judgments for Paul were appropri-
ate in all age-groups), we conclude that the differences most probably reflect maturation and 
not simple differences in performance. The fact that we did not find any gender differences in 
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adults related either to behavior or to neuronal activation speaks for developmental changes in 
gender differences rather than permanent differences between men and women. Further, it 
could be argued that female participants required differential neuronal strategies for thinking 
about a male person, since only female subjects had to perform cross-gender judgments. We 
therefore asked children and adolescents to indicate how much they feel like Paul (irrespec-
tive of gender); we did not find a difference between girls and boys. This is further supported 
by the fact that general reaction times and judgments for 1PP and 3PP did not differ between 
females and males.  
A principal weakness of this and other studies investigating social-information processing in 
adolescents is the lack of information about the developmental stages of puberty. A recent 
study investigating the interrelation between the pubertal rises in testosterone and estradiol 
and brain structure in 10-15 years old boys and girls demonstrated that the increased produc-
tion of estradiol in pubescent girls seems to be directly related to the gray matter density de-
crease in frontal and parietal regions. Despite the described structural changes in neuro-
anatomy (Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2004) many changes in social 
behavior take place during adolescence. Sexuality and romantic interest emerge; adolescents 
spend more time with peers than with their parents and families and the importance and com-
plexity of peer relationships increases. A second weakness of the present study is the unbal-
ance of female and male participants within the adult participants. Thus, there is a certain 
danger that the lack of gender differences in adults could be explained by the fact that eight of 
twelve participants were females. 
The purpose of developmental neuroimaging studies is to gain insight into structural and func-
tional maturation and the mechanism underlying basic developmental processes. It is very 
challenging to discern the effects of structural and hormonal variances, the brain’s inherent 
plasticity and the dynamic interplay between the brain and its environment, especially during 
the time period of puberty. Our functional neuroimaging data showed that increasing profi-
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ciency in perspective taking has different neural underpinnings in girls and boys. In females it 
was related to decreasing activation in prefrontal cortex, whereas males showed decreased 
lateralization in the inferior parietal cortex  
 
Growing comprehension of how changes in social behaviour, including social perception, 
social emotion and social cognition, are related to neurodevelopment and endocrinological 
variance will help to understand the brain-behavior relation in both normal and pathological 
conditions and, finally, will help to treat disorders involving impaired social behavior.  
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7  General Discussion 
In the present PhD thesis the functional development of neuronal correlates of cognitive per-
spective taking was investigated. The first study describes the neural development of cogni-
tive perspective taking in children and the second explored gender-related functional devel-
opment of cognitive perspective taking in pubescent boys and girls.  
The results of study 1 indicate that cognitive perspective taking develops after the age in 
which most classic social cognitive tasks are accomplishable. Although children and adults 
were equally appropriate in their judgments for another person, we found differences in the 
efficiency of perspective taking. In line with our findings Choudhury recently reported in-
creasing proficiency in perspective taking during adolescence which she hypothesized might 
be related to the parallel development of its underlying neural circuitry (Choudhury et al., 
2006). We showed for the first time that the development of perspective taking is associated 
with changes in brain activity within the described fronto-parietal network. Our results indi-
cate a developmental shift from prefrontal to posterior and from bilateral to unilateral inferior 
parietal cortex brain activation. Even though there are only a few studies on the development 
of the neural network underlying social cognitive processes, several authors reported a de-
crease of medial prefrontal activation with age. Thus, the findings of the first study are in line 
with the previous developmental studies in terms of the decrease of prefrontal cortex activa-
tion. However, in contrast to the reported findings we mainly observed a decrease of activa-
tion within the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex instead of the medial prefrontal cortex. The 
DLPFC is known to play a critical role in executive function, particularly in cognitive control 
(Aron et al., 2004; Blasi et al., 2006; Bunge et al., 2002; Fecteau et al., 2007; Knoch et al., 
2007; Knoch et al., 2006; Menon et al., 2001). From developmental psychology we know that 
higher cognitive control and attention functions develop long into adolescence (Davidson et 
al. 2006). Interestingly several social psychological studies have demonstrated that even 
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adults frequently use self-knowledge as the primary basis for developing a model of what 
others know and feel, which has been described as a default mode of reasoning about others’ 
mind. This egocentric bias can be interpreted as failure to suppress one’s own perspective 
(Gilovich et al., 2002; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman et al., 2003; Vorauer et al., 1999). Consid-
ering this background the 3PP specific activation of the DLPFC in children may indicate that 
processing a 3PP requires children more than adults to inhibit their own prepotent egocentric 
perspective while they reason about Paul’s perspective. 
In addition our data provide new evidence that especially the parietal cortex plays an impor-
tant role in the development of processing a third person’s perspective. In contrast we did not 
find any developmental differences in brain activation associated with self-related processing.  
As mentioned in the introduction, several functional neuroimaging studies indicated that the 
inferior parietal cortex particularly in the right hemisphere (including the temporo-parietal 
junction) is associated with a variety of social cognitive tasks such as perspective taking (e.g. 
(Ruby & Decety, 2003), theory of mind (Saxe et al., 2005) and empathy (Jackson, Brunet et 
al., 2006). This led to the speculation that this region is specialized for the human ability to 
reason about others affective and cognitive mental states (Saxe, 2006). However, it is impor-
tant to note that the inferior parietal cortex is not only activated during higher-order social 
cognitive processes such as perspective taking but also when individuals are required to dis-
tinguish between themselves and others (Decety & Sommerville, 2003). Two recent studies 
demonstrated a selective impairment of self-other distinctions when repetitive transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) was applied over the right inferior parietal lobule as participants 
performed a perceptual task involving discrimination between photographs of themselves and 
of a familiar face (Uddin et al., 2006). Self-other judgments on whole arm reaching move-
ments (Preston et al., 2008) were also impaired when TMS was applied over the right but not 
over the left inferior parietal cortex. These results provide direct evidence for a causal role of 
the right inferior parietal cortex for self-other discriminations. Furthermore, damage to this 
  75 
region not only led to the inability to represent other persons’ perspective (Samson, 2004) it 
can also produce disorders associated with self-awareness, such anosognosia (Berlucchi et al., 
1997). Direct electrical stimulation can induce out-of body experiences (i.e. the experience 
that oneself is located outside of the own body) (Blanke et al., 2002). In line with these find-
ings, the additional activation of the right IPL during 3PP processing in children of our study 
might reflect that children compared to adults need more self-other discrimination during the 
processing of other people’s perspectives. Since we were able to show that the activation of 
the right inferior parietal cortex was focal rather than diffuse, we suggest that the higher de-
pendence on this brain region indicate that children use a different cognitive strategy. It seems 
that they need to keep the self-other distinction activated while they are anticipating another 
person’s perspective.  
 
Previous neuroimaging studies on development, reported similar patterns of neural activation 
among children and adults, whilst children convey more distributed patterns of neural activa-
tion and a decrease of BOLD signal as compared to adults. Such a change in patterns of neu-
ral activity has been referred to as a focalization of neural development (Casey et al., 2005; 
Durston et al., 2006). The usual explanation for greater variation in neural activity across 
brain regions is that cognitive strategies are less efficient in children, whereas enhanced activ-
ity in focal brain areas during maturation has been interpreted as being due to increased effi-
ciency and neural pruning. A problem, however, with interpreting focalization in brain imag-
ing is that differences in neural activity can be confounded by differences in variability be-
tween groups: a more heterogeneous or incoherent pattern of neural activity not only leads to 
a more distributed network but also to a reduction of neural activity. Thus, to determine if 
focalization of neural activity during maturation occurs, one has to disentangle measures of 
variance and measures of signal change (Berl et al., 2006; Xiong et al., 2000).  
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We found similar (or even reduced) degree of variance in the distribution of neural activity in 
children as compared with adults. Since the more widespread activation in children in our 
study can’t be explained by greater inter-subject variances (neither within the adult network 
nor between different areas of the children’s network) we conclude that children use a qualita-
tively different (extended) but a coherent rather than diffuse neural network.  
A possible explanation for the differences in brain activation in children compared to adults is 
cortical maturation, in particular grey matter reorganization and white matter increase 
throughout adolescence and early adulthood. Since the prefrontal cortex and the inferior parie-
tal cortex are among the last brain regions to mature (Gogtay et al., 2004) it is plausible that 
these region contains less well functioning connections, leading to more activation for tasks 
that recruit them. Alternatively one can argue that more attention is needed by children to 
perform the task (judge according to Paul). By separating the groups into good and bad per-
former we examined whether the differences in brain activation between children and adults 
are caused by maturation rather than performance differences in reaction times. Since we did 
not find performance related differences in brain activation we can rule out this argument.  
 
 
The focus of the second study was the investigation of neural network underlying cognitive 
perspective taking at the onset of puberty. We were particularly interested in developmental 
differences between girls and boys. Although a handful studies explored developmental gen-
der-differences in neural network until now nothing is known about gender-dependent devel-
opment in perspective taking abilities. The results of the second study showed, that children, 
young adolescents and adults did not differ in their qualitative appreciation of a third-person’s 
perspective and thus all participants performed the task appropriately. Despite the appropriate 
judgments, the results of the second study showed that the efficiency of perspective taking 
continues to develop during adolescence and in addition the development was different be-
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tween girls and boys. Whereas the proficiency in females increases from the age of 8 to 14 
years, this was much less the case for developing males. Furthermore, the developmental dif-
ferences in the neural bases of perspective taking were especially pronounced during adoles-
cent and different in girls and boys.  
The results of study 1 revealed that children compared to adults showed more prefrontal and 
bilateral parietal activation patterns. We found any gender differences neither behavioral nor 
neuronal. In contrast to these finding, study 2 demonstrated that pubescent girls and boy sig-
nificantly differ in their proficiency of perspective taking (RT) as well as in their neural 
activation patterns. We therefore analyzed how the efficiency is related to brain activation in 
females and males separately. These data indicated that the more efficient female children and 
adolescents are (lesser RT between 3PP and 1PP) the lesser their judgments were related to 
prefrontal brain activation. This was not the case for male children and adolescents. In males a 
lesser lateralization of activity within the inferior parietal cortex was found to be related with 
increasing proficiency in processing 3PP. 
Importantly, the fact that gender-differences were not observable in children (8-10) and also 
absent in adults (whether behaviorally nor neuronal) suggests a different neural development 
between boys and girls rather than permanent differences between men and women. A tran-
sient shift of performance in social information processing has been described in earlier be-
havioral studies. The performance in face processing was found to increase during the first 
decade of life and was followed by a transient decline of performance during puberty after 
which performance again improved to the level before puberty (Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore 
et al., 2006; Carey et al., 1980; Diamond et al., 1983; Mcgivern et al., 2002). Interestingly, the 
dip in performance seem to be related to the onset of puberty rather than age per se – since it 
was earlier in girls (around the age of 10-11 years) and than boys (11-12).  
Although, in our study as well as the mentioned studies no measures of puberty was taken, 
our behavioral and neuronal data together with the reported finding from behavioral studies 
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suggest that sex hormones may influence neuroanatomical changes within the frontal and pa-
rietal cortex which in turn may influence the underlying cognitive processes during adoles-
cence. Nevertheless, the present findings demonstrated that the neural network of perspective 
taking develops beyond childhood. The developmental changes are especially pronounced 
during puberty where females and males differ in their behavioral as well as neural develop-
ment of cognitive perspective taking. But despite the reported development of cognitive per-
spective taking, many changes in social behavior take place during adolescence. Thus, to un-
derstand adolescent behavior more information about the interplay between socio-cultural 
factors, biological changes and social information-processing during puberty should be taking 
into account.  
  79 
8. Outlook 
While several studies investigated the neural development of social perception such as face 
recognition, only a handful studies focused on the development of the more complex social-
cognitive information processing in the field of neuroscience as well as in developmental psy-
chology (for review see Blakemore, 2008).  
The investigation of the neural bases of social cognition requires the fragmentation of a com-
plex ability into its components. Thus, real life situation are always much more complex than 
fMRI tasks can ever be. Therefore, for future research it might be useful to have instruments 
with naturalistic settings to assess children’s and adolescent’s social behavior outside the 
scanner environment which in turn can be compared with the neuronal development. 
Studying the interplay between brain and social behavior during development is fascinating, 
but it poses also unique challenges. Beyond the lack of reliable tools to behaviorally asses 
social cognitive abilities there are many fundamental outstanding questions of general brain 
development.  
How do structural, functional and cognitive development interact? 
A very important question is, how synaptic reorganization influences neural activity and cog-
nitive functions. Several developmental studies reported more widespread brain activation 
patterns in children compared to adults. The reported shift from diffuse to focal brain activa-
tion is presumably an experience-driven refinement of the association cortex. These findings 
seem to parallel changes observed over shorter time periods in studies of adult learning. There 
might be several alternative explanations for more extended brain activation. As children al-
most always perform worse than adults on higher cognitive tasks, the additionally activated 
brain regions might be a result of compensatory strategies. Furthermore, cognitive strategies 
to solve a specific task are likely to change with development – thus the degree of engage-
ment of certain regions may systematically change with development.  
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Future work is needed to understand how learning during development affects activation pat-
tern.  
How to deal with enhances variability within developmental samples? 
Another problem concerns the comparison of children’s and adults activation pattern. Since 
children of the same age are likely to differ more than adults of the same age the statistical 
group comparison assumption that individual groups are homogenous is misleading – con-
cerning structural features (grey and whiter matter) as well as performances level. Current 
fMRI analyses are designed to identify common brain activation within a population and 
thereby underestimate the contribution of individual activation patterns. Since the enhanced 
variability is a crucial characteristic of development, it is necessary to develop new methods 
to accurately identify normal and as well as adaptive or atypical variants of development. 
What about the contribution of hormones? 
Furthermore, virtually nothing is known about how neural activity and cognitive functions are 
affected by hormonal changes during adolescence. For a first step toward a better understand-
ing of its relationship, it would be very helpful, when future studies could include measures of 
puberty (e.g. Tanner stages as well as hormone levels).  
 
Taken together, late childhood and adolescence is a period of synaptic reorganization there-
fore, it might be argued that the brain is much more sensitive to social experiential inputs dur-
ing this period of time. The present PhD thesis focused on the development of the neural 
bases and provided new evidence that cognitive perspective taking abilities develop beyond 
the age at which most classic social cognitive tasks are accomplishable. Furthermore we could 
show that pubescent girls and boys differ in their development. A comprehensive understand-
ing of changes in children’s and adolescents social behavior requires a multidisciplinary ap-
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proach that recognizes the complex interactions between genetics, brain structures, physiol-
ogy and chemistry as well as environment including socio-cultural influences. 
 
Hopefully, social neuroscientist will keep collaborating with investigators from multiple dis-
ciplines such anthropology, ethnology, psychology as well as neurobiology, chemistry and 
endocrinology.  
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